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Myriad Genetics, Inc. ("Myriad") obtained patents in the 1990s on two "isolated" human breast and 
ovarian cancer susceptibility genes ("BRCA").  Myriad did not list all the isolated sequences it claims to 
have a right to monopolize, but instead claims a patent on the physical phenomena itself -- all DNA 
segments that code for the BRCA1 polypeptide, even the sequences Myriad has not identified and even 
those someone else in the future creates or isolates the sequences of through a method or methods not 
contemplated by Myriad. 
 
An impressive array of non-profit medical societies, doctors and patients sued to have the Myriad patents 
declared invalid.  In 2010, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held in Association 
for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office that the claimed product patents 
for isolated DNA segments constituted unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101.  On July 29, 
2011, a divided panel of the Federal Circuit reversed the District Court and held that the isolated DNA 
segments constituted patentable subject matter.   
 
Of the three member panel, Judge Lourie concluded that the isolated DNA was markedly different than 
the native DNA, so constituted patentable subject matter.  Although Judge Moore agreed that certain 
DNA segments constituted patentable subject matter, she believed that the longer isolated DNA segments 
probably did not constitute patentable subject matter.  However, primarily in light of the fact that the US 
Patent and Trademark Office has been granting patents for isolated DNA for years, Judge Moore 
concurred in the judgment of Judge Lourie.  Judge Bryson concurred on one of the product claims  (for 
synthetic cDNA) but dissented on claims pertaining to the isolated DNA segments on the grounds that 
isolated DNA did not differ markedly from the native DNA and that the function of the isolated DNA was 
identical to the function of the native DNA. 
 
The Supreme Court stated that "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to 
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already 
available."  This article argues that the Federal Circuit - not Congress - has done just that and has given 
Myriad a wall to restrict free access to materials that have literally been in humans for centuries.  The 
isolated DNA segments of claim 1 do exactly the same coding as do the native segments--nothing more; 
nothing less.  The segments of claim 1 do not act as primers or probes, so they do not have markedly 
different characteristics or utility than native DNA, which the Supreme Court has ruled courts must 
consider.  Moreover, the functioning of the sequence of the nucleotide bases is a physical phenomenon 
that Myriad has not created but has captured in its claim.  Judges Lourie and Moore disregarded Supreme 
Court precedent and the fundamental principle that physical phenomena are not patentable subject matter.
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"Before I built a wall I'd ask to know 
What I was walling in or walling out, 
And to whom I was like to give offence. 




Patents, like walls, exclude.  A patent holder can sue anyone who uses her patented 
product without permission and, with appropriate proof, obtain injunctive relief against the 
defendant's continued use of the product.2  Creating walls in the field of health care, Myriad 
Genetics, Inc. ("Myriad") obtained patents in the 1990s on two "isolated" human breast and 
ovarian cancer susceptibility genes ("BRCA") and sued two companies providing clinical BRCA 
testing for patent infringement.3  Issues in those cases could have included: 
 
 Can isolated DNA be the subject of patent protection?4 
 Do patents on isolated DNA segments harmfully wall off such "products of 
nature" from use by scientists in medical research and treatment of diseases?5   
 Does patent protection provide an appropriate incentive for scientists and 
companies to progress further in the field of medical research and treatment? 6   
                                                          
1Robert Frost, Mending Wall, http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/173530 (last visited June 30, 2011). 
235 U.S.C. §§ 271(a), 281, 283, 284 (2006). 
3Ass‘n for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir.  
2011) ("The challenged composition claims cover two 'isolated' human genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2 (collectively, 
'BRCA1/2' or 'BRCA'), and certain alterations, or mutations, in these genes associated with a predisposition to breast 
and ovarian cancers.") and 5-7 (Fed. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter AMP2] .   
4
See, e.g., Eileen M. Kane, Patent Ineligibility: Maintaining A Scientific Public Domain, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 519, 
524 (2006) [hereinafter Ineligibility] ("Is it proper to regard scientific knowledge or research tools as subjects of 
intellectual property?"). 
5
See case cited infra note 8 where the Plaintiffs in AMP1 claimed, "Such patents ... would cause more harm than 
good to society and technological development. In the BRCA context, the existence of the challenged patents has 
resulted in exclusive genetic testing, thereby limiting access to different types of testing methods and alternative 
laboratories for patients and their physicians, and produced a chilling effect on research."  See also Memorandum of 
Law (1) in Further Support of Plaintiffs‘ Motion for Summary Judgment Against All Defendants and (2) in 
Opposition to the Myriad Defendants‘ Motion for Summary Judgment and (3) in Opposition to Defendant United 
States Patent and Trademark Office‘s Motion for Judgment On the Pleadings, 2010 WL 1048410 (S.D.N.Y.), at*5;  
Bryan Nese, Bilski On Biotech: The Potential For Limiting The Negative Impact Of Gene Patents, 46 Calif. W. L. 
Rev. 137, 174 (2009) ("[G]ene patents represent a group of patents that generally hinder innovation and therefore act 
contrary to the Patent Clause"). 
6
See case cited infra note 8 for defendant Myriad's claim in AMP1 ("The BRCA patents have not stifled research--in 
fact, Myriad has consistently promoted and subsidized research on the BRCA genes. Over 18,000 scientists 
(including eight of the plaintiffs or their declarants) have conducted research on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, and 
 





However, the defendants agreed to stop the challenged activities, and there was not a ruling on 
the merits.7   
Subsequently an impressive array of non-profit medical societies, doctors, and patients 
sued to have the Myriad patents declared invalid.8  In 2010, the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York held in Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and 
Trademark Office ("AMP1") that the claimed patents for isolated DNA segments constituted 
unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101. 9  Myriad appealed the decision that all the 
"challenged claims are drawn to unpatentable subject matter," and on July 29, 2011, in a 2-1 
decision, the Federal Circuit reversed the District Court and held that the product claims 
constituted patentable subject matter ("AMP2").10  No prior court had directly ruled that isolated 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
have published more than 7,000 papers on those genes since Myriad's patents were issued.  And these BRCA patents 
have catalyzed improved patient access to BRCA testing‖). See also Myriad Defendants' Memorandum of Law (1) in 
Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment and (2) in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
2009 WL 5785008 (S.D.N.Y.) ,at * 1. 
7 AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1340. 
8Ass‘n for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F.Supp.2d 181, 184, 186-189 
(S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2010, as amended Apr, 5, 2010) [hereinafter AMP1], aff’d in par, rev’d in part , 653 F.3d 1329  
(Fed. Cir. 2011).  The plaintiffs included the Association for Molecular Pathology, the American College of Medical 
Genetics, the American Society for Clinical Pathology, the College of American Pathologists and a number of 
women diagnosed with breast or ovarian cancer.  AMP1 at 186-189.  One patient diagnosed with breast cancer 
"sought a second opinion of that test result but learned that Myriad is the only laboratory in the country that can 
provide full BRCA1/2 sequencing."  Id. at 189. 
9The court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part, denied Myriad's motion for summary judgment 
and granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  
AMP1 at 238.  The USPTO's motion related to the claims of plaintiffs that the patents at issue violated article I, 
section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  See 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant United States Patent and Trademark Office‘s , Motion for Judgment 
on the Pleadings and in Opposition to Plaintiffs‘ Motion for Summary Judgment, 2009 WL 5785024 (S.D.N.Y.),at * 
2.  For discussions of the decision in AMP1, see Eileen M. Kane, Patenting Genes and Genetic Methods: What's At 
Stake?, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 11-18 (2011) [hereinafter Patenting]; Andrew S. Robertson, The Role of DNA 
Patents In Genetic Test Innovation And Access, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 377, at *13-15 ( 2011); Miri Yoon, 
Gene Patenting Debate: The Meaning Of Myriad, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 953 ( 2010) . 
10
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1333, 1354-59.  The Federal Circuit also reversed the District Court‘s decision that one of the 
methods (screening potential cancer therapeutics) was not patentable but affirmed the District Court‘s decision that 
the other method claims (comparing or analyzing DNA sequences) were not patentable.  Id. at 1355-58. (Judge 
Lourie) [hereinafter Majority Opinion]; Id. at 1364-67 (Moore, J., concurring) [hereinafter Concurring Opinion] 
 




DNA segments constituted patentable subject matter.11  The plaintiffs petitioned for a panel 
rehearing (the "Petition"), and on September 13, the Federal Circuit denied the Petition.  In 
October, the plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme 
Court.12  In light of the three different opinions and the acknowledgment of the crucial issues 
involved,13 this article recommends the Supreme Court hear the case.   
 The direct question regarding the product claims is whether isolated DNA segments are 
patentable under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution (hereafter the 
"Patent Clause") and 35 U.S.C. §101 (§101).14  The Patent Clause is both a grant of power to and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(concurring on the method claims and noting that the claims to isolated cDNA segments constituted patentable 
subject matter ; agreeing with the judgment on the other product claims without agreeing with the reasoning of the 
Majority Opinion on the DNA product claims); Id. at 1373 (Bryson, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) 
[hereinafter Dissent] (concurring with the Majority Opinion on the method and cDNA claims, but dissented on the 
other product claims). 
11Intervet, Inc. v. Merial, Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2010 ) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (noting that isolated DNA can be defined as a segment of DNA "which is substantially separated from other 
cellular components which naturally accompany a native human sequence or protein." ).  See also infra  note 140. 
122011 WL 5057016, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 2011) (arguing in the Petition, "The Court Erred In Failing To 
Consider Whether The DNA Fragments Claimed In These Patents Are Products Of Nature");  Allison Dobson, 
Classen: Has the Federal Circuit Lost Interest in Patentable Subject Matter?, GENOMICS LAW REPORT (Sept. 14, 
2011), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/tag/myriad-genetics/ (reporting the denial of the petition for 
rehearing); Tom Harvey, Utah Firm’s Gene Patent Case Could Go To Supreme Court, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE 
(Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/money/52711149-79/court-myriad-genes-aclu.html.csp (statement of 
counsel for plaintiffs of intention to petition the Supreme Court).   
13In spite of ruling against the plaintiffs in AMP2, the Federal Circuit acknowledged the importance of the issues 
when it observed the genetic testing at issue "provides a patient with information on her risk for hereditary breast 
and ovarian cancers, and thus aids in the difficult decision regarding whether to undertake preventive options, 
including prophylactic surgery. Diagnostic results can also be an important factor in structuring an appropriate 
course of cancer treatment, since certain forms of chemotherapy are more effective in treating cancers related to 
BRCA mutations."  AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1339. 
14
See infra text accompanying notes 135-139.  The answer to this question will of course affect the patentability of 
other genetic and biological material.  See Patenting, supra note 9, at 9 ("The resolution of eligibility for genes has 
implications for the patenting of other biomolecules. The resolution of eligibility of genetic testing methods has 
implications for the contours of the preemption analysis as applied to subject matter in the life and physical sciences, 
an issue that will likely emerge in such fields as nanotechnology.").  The Patent Clause provides, "Congress shall 
have the power  ...  To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."14  U.S. CONST., ART. I, § 8, cl. 8 
(capitalization as in the Constitution).  In the Patent Clause, "useful Arts", "Inventors" and "Discoveries" provide the 
basis for patent statutes and "Science", "Authors" and "Writings" provide the basis for copyright statutes.  See, e.g., 
1 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS §1.11 (4th Ed. 2003);  1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS  
OV-2, OV-3, 1-6 and 1-7. 
 




a limitation on the power of Congress.15  As a result, "Congress may not authorize the issuance 
of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict 
free access to materials already available."16  By statute, a person may obtain a patent if she 
"invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement," and if the invention meets the other requirements 
for a patent.17 
 The Supreme Court has cautioned that there are limits to the scope of patentable subject 
matter under §101,18 even though the Court has interpreted §101 expansively and described it as 
"a dynamic provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions."19  The "laws of 
                                                          
15Graham v. John Deere Company of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).  John Deere involved whether a patent for  
a "Clamp for vibrating Shank Plows" was obvious and therefore invalid.  Id. at 4.   
16383 U.S. at 6 (emphasis added), also citing concurring opinions of Justices Douglas and Black in Great Atl. & Pac. 
Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (in which Justices Douglas and Black said that 
"[t]he Congress does not have free reign, for example, to decide that patents should be easily or freely given. The 
Congress acts under the restraint imposed by the statement of purpose in Art. I, s 8.").  See also, Richard Seth 
Gipstein, The Isolation And Purification Exception To The General Unpatentability Of Products Of Nature, 4 
COLUMBIA SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002) (quoting Deere and concluding that "[i]t therefore follows that the 
invalidation of patents claiming products of nature, which have been deemed by the Supreme Court to be ―free to all 
men and reserved exclusively to none,‖ ...  is constitutionally mandated. There need not be any statutory authority to 
deny patents that claim products of nature.").   
1735 U.S.C. §101 (2006).   
18Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) ("This is not to suggest that §101 has no limits or that it 
embraces every discovery."); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) ("The Court‘s precedents provide three 
specific exceptions to §101‘s broad patent-eligibility principles.").  The current four categories in §101 (process, 
machine manufacture and composition of matter) are essentially the same categories that have been capable of being 
patented since the passage of the first patent statute in 1790.  In 1790, the statutory categories were "any useful art, 
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement thereon not before known or used."  Chisum, supra 
note 16, at OV-2, OV-3,  1-6,  1-7.  In 1793, the categories were amended to "any useful art, machine, manufacture 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement, not known or used before the application."  Id.  In 
1952, Congress replaced "art" with "process", but stated that process meant "process, art or method."  Id.  In addition 
to the requirements in §101, in order for an invention to be patentable, the invention must be novel within the 
meaning of §102(a) and not obviousness within the meaning of §103), and the application must contain disclosures 
about the invention that satisfy the requirements of §112.  Regardless of whether or not the claimed invention meets 
the other criteria for a patent, an individual cannot obtain a patent unless the invention "falls within one of the 
express categories of patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. §101."  Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 
483 (1974). 
19J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi Breed Intern., Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 135, 145 (2001) (holding "that newly 
developed plant breeds fall within the terms of §101."). The Supreme Court has defined "manufacture" broadly as 
―the production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, 
properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery.‖  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308  (quoting 
 




nature", "physical phenomena" and "abstract ideas" are limited as not patentable subject matter.20  
Professor Kane has explained, "The underlying rationale for the exclusions is that scientific 
advances depend on an available substrate of basic knowledge, and that, therefore, patenting the 
intellectual foundations of a field has an adverse effect on its progress."21  What may be a 
"process," a "composition of matter," or a "manufacture" in the ordinary meaning of those terms 
is not patentable subject matter if the proposed patent claims a law of nature, a physical 
phenomenon, or an abstract idea.22   
 The Supreme Court has not defined "physical phenomena," but gave relevant examples of 
unpatentable subject matter.  In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Court said the following examples 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)).  The Court has defined "composition of 
matter" very broadly as including ―all compositions of two or more substances and . . . all composite articles, 
whether they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders 
or solids.‖  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F.Supp. 279, 280 (D.C.1957)).  
The Court noted that a Senate committee report on the 1952 Patent Act had said, "Congress intended statutory 
subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man,‖ but the Supreme Court clearly meant that 
general statement was limited by the principle the Court repeated in Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309, that the laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable, because they are not made by humans.  
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.  For positions that the quote from the Senate Committee report was more limited 
when considering the context, see Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3248-49 (Stevens, J., concurring); Oskar Liivak, The 
Forgotten Originality Requirement: A Constitutional Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J.PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 
261, 279-281 (2005); MOY, supra note 14, at 5-8 ("while both Congress and the courts have stated that the statutory 
language of section 101 encompasses 'anything under the sun that is made by man,' ... this is decidedly not the case.  
Instead, the authorities have agreed that certain types of activity are non-statutory subject matter, even where the 
particular subject matter at hand could be described nominally in the terms of section 101 as, for example, a process 
or an article of manufacture."). 
20
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 
(1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O‘Reilly v. Morse, 15 U.S. 65, 112-
121 (1854); and Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853)).  See also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (referring to the 
three exceptions to patentable subject matter under §101 as "laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract 
ideas.").  In Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981), the Court referred to "natural phenomena" as 
unpatentable; in Benson, 409 U.S. at 67, the Court referred to "Phenomena of nature" as unpatentable; and in 
Parker, 437 U.S. at 589, the Court referred to "Phenomena of nature" as unpatentable.  The Court appears to use 
those terms interchangeably, but since the Court in Bilski - the most recent decision - and in Chakrabarty to 
"physical phenomena" as the third exception to patentable subject matter, this article generally uses "physical 
phenomena." 
21Kane, supra note 9, at 4-5. 
22
See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 ("Any suggestion in this Court‘s case law that the Patent Act‘s terms deviate from 
their ordinary meaning has only been an explanation for the exceptions for laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas.").  In Bilski, the Supreme Court limited the meaning of "process" to avoid the issuance of a patent for 
an abstract idea.  Id. at 3229-31.   
 




did not constitute patentable subject matter:  a new mineral discovered in the earth, a new plant 
found in the wild, Einstein's "law" of relativity, and the "law" of gravity discovered by Newton.23  
In Parker v. Flook, in dissenting on whether the process at issue was patentable, the Chief Justice 
and Justices Stewart and Rhenquist said, "A patent could not issue, in other words, on the law of 
gravity, or the multiplication tables, or the phenomena of magnetism, or the fact that water at sea 
level boils at 100 degrees centigrade and freezes at zero—even though newly discovered."24  In 
Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., the Court said, "The qualities of these bacteria, 
like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of 
knowledge of all men.  They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men, and reserved 
exclusively to none.""25   
The common definition of "phenomenon" is "an occurrence or fact that is perceptible by; 
the senses," and absent any statutory definition, the Supreme Court relies on the common 
understanding and definition of a word for its meaning.26  Certainly some of the examples given 
by the Justices are abstract ideas (e.g., multiplication tables) and laws of nature (e.g., the law of 
relativity), but others are physical phenomena (e.g., magnetism and electricity) within the 
common understanding of the phrase.27  Comparing the "observable occurrences" of a claimed 
                                                          
23
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.  For a more complete discussion of Chakrabarty, see discussion infra  Part  III.B.3. 
24
Parker, 437 U.S. at 598-599  (The majority did not disagree with those examples). 
25333 U.S. at 130.   
26
See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed.2006).  Similarly, Merriam-Webster defines phenomena as "an 
observable fact or event." See MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/phenomenon (last visited 8/28/2011).  For the Supreme Court's general reliance on 
dictionary definitions and common understandings of words, see Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308, and Bilski, 130 S. 
Ct. at 3226. 
27
See e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2006) (defining "electricity" as, "The physical 
phenomena arising from the attraction of particles with opposite charges and the repulsion of particles with the same 
charge." and "magnetism" as "The properties and effects associated with a magnetic field.").  See also MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2011) http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/magnetism (last visited Aug. 14, 2011) 
(defining magnetisim as "a class of physical phenomena that include the attraction for iron observed in lodestone 
 




invention with those of the natural analog of the invention is one test the courts consistently 
follow in construing whether an invention constitutes patentable subject matter (but the Federal 
Circuit rejected that consideration in AMP2).28 
This article argues that the Federal Circuit was wrong in AMP2 for three basic reasons.  
First, although humans developed the process of isolating DNA segments, and such processes 
can be patentable subject matter,29 humans did not originally develop either the nucleotides or 
the sequence of nucleotides, nor did humans create the coding of the proteins.  The isolated DNA 
segments of claim 1 are not patentable subject matter, because the characteristics and uses of 
those segments are not markedly different from the analogous native DNA segments, the test for 
patentable subject matter under Chakrabarty.30  
Second, isolated DNA segments "coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide" constitute 
unpatentable physical phenomena, just as magnetism and electricity are unpatentable 
phenomena.31  Indeed, product claim 1 expressly claims not "simply" one nucleotide sequence, 
but the phenomena - and thus all the sequences - ―coding for a BRACA1 polypeptide, said 
polypeptide having the amino acid sequences set forth in SEQ ID No:2.‖32  In turn, by definition 
claim 1 does not include any sequences that do not code for the BRCA1 polypeptide -- it simply 
claims the physical phenomena, which the Supreme Court said constitutes unpatentable subject 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and a magnet, are inseparably associated with moving electricity, are exhibited by both magnets and electric 
currents, and are characterized by fields of force."). 
28
See infra Parts II.A, II.B, III.B.2. See also sources cited supra note 10.   
29
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313 (explaining that "Congress ... recognized the relevant distinction [between patentable 
and unpatentable subject matter] was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, 
whether living or not, and human-made inventions."). 
30
See infra Part III.B.3. 
31
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. 
32
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1334.  See also Jeffrey A. Lefstein, The Formal Structure Of Patent Law And The Limits Of 
Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1168 ( 2008) (explaining "because multiple DNA molecules can encode 
the same polypeptide, an inventor discovering a novel protein will typically claim the genes of all DNA molecules 
encoding that protein."). 
 




matter.  Unfortunately the majority opinion rejected any consideration of the phenomena of the 
DNA segments.33 
Third, both the majority opinion and concurring opinion argue that (1) it is significant the 
USPTO has granted patents on isolated DNA segments for years and (2) patentable subject 
matter under §101 is expansive.  Although patentable subject matter under §101 is expansive, the 
courts have made clear that physical phenomena, laws of nature and abstract ideas are 
boundaries over which patentable subject matter does not trespass.  The courts established these 
boundaries, and the USPTO has no special expertise in interpreting them.  Indeed, the USPTO 
was wrong for years in granting business method patents for "processes" under a lax standard 
that the Supreme Court subsequently rejected as an unpatentable abstract idea.34  Moreover, 
recently the United States has essentially disavowed the past practices of the USPTO with 
respect to isolated DNA segments, as discussed in part IIC2 below.35  
Part II of this article provides a history of cases on patentable subject matter and related 
topics, much of which history the majority opinion and concurring opinion ignore.36 Part III 37 
                                                          
33
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1353.  Would claim 1 have constituted patentable subject matter if Myriad had revised claim 1 
to list the many different nucleotide sequences that code for the BRCA1 polypeptide rather than defining the subject 
matter as base sequences that code for the BRCA1 polypeptide?   First, the analysis in that situation would still have 
to consider- under Chakrabarty - whether the characteristics and uses of the claimed invention would have been 
markedly different than the native sequences.  The reasoning in IVA4 and IVA5 of this article might argue that the 
characteristics and uses would still not be markedly different, so the revised claim would still constitute unpatentable 
subject matter, regardless of whether or not the claim constituted unpatentable physical phenomena.  Second, even if 
this analysis concluded the revised claimed subject matter was markedly different from the native DNA segments, 
the analysis should separately consider whether claiming the listed sequences rather than pre-empted the physical 
phenomena and thus remained unpatentable subject matter.  For the seminal article that the isolated DNA would pre-
empt the physical phenomena and be unpatentable subject matter, see Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA 
Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. REV. 707, 709 (2004). [hereinafter Splitting]. 
34Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229-30 (2010).  
35
See infra text accompanying notes 225-228. 
36
See discussion infra Part II. This history both supports the conclusion that the isolated DNA segments are not 
patentable subject matter and suggests that the argument of the Majority Opinion and Concurring Opinion that 
expectations were that isolated DNA segments were patentable were not based on fact.  This article does not 
concede, however, that whatever expectations may have resulted from USPTO actions is relevant. 
37
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1339. 
 




discusses the representative patents and critiques the majority opinion and concurring opinion in 
AMP2, based on the dissent and cases discussed in Part III.  Part III also shows there is no policy 
reason for the Supreme Court in this case to narrow its prior precedents.  Part IV gives 
concluding observations, and there is an Appendix that summarizes basic scientific knowledge 
about DNA, genes, RNA and related matters, largely from discussions in AMP1, AMP2 and 
textbooks.38 
 
II. WHAT IS NOT PATENTABLE 
 
A. Product of Nature Doctrine in the Nineteenth Century 
 
1. Nineteenth century cases 
 
Since the elements of patentability for inventions have stayed strikingly similar since 
1790, nineteenth century patent decisions involving nature and natural forces remain relevant to 
the issues in AMP1 and AMP2.  In 1841, for instance, in In re Kemper, the D.C. Circuit rejected 
a patent claim for an improvement in the manner of stowing ice.39  Rejecting the patent claim, 
the court said it was "the discovery of a fact which existed long before . . . that ice placed 
edgewise kept longer than when placed flatwise.  This is a mere naked discovery, for which a 
patent cannot be granted."40  
The court in Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary expressly addressed the question of 
                                                          
38
Id.  at 1335, n. 1("The district court's opinion ... contains a detailed and comprehensive discussion of the science 
involved in this case.   We repeat only the basics here.").  This article therefore assumes that there were no 
disagreements on the facts between the decisions in AMP1 and AMP2 on claim 1, so this article cites discussions of 
the science pertaining to DNA and related matters from both AMP1 and AMP2.  AMP2 has some very helpful 
diagrams on DNA that any reader not immersed in the science of DNA may want to review.  See AMP2, 653 F.3d at 
1335-36, figures 1-4. 
39
In re Kemper, 14 F. Cas. 286, No. 7687 (C.C. D.C. 1841). 
40
Id. at 288 (emphasis added). 
 




whether  "the subject matter of the alleged invention [is] patentable?"41  The court concluded the 
answer is no, since  "[w]e have, after all, only a new or more perfect effect of a well-known 
chemical agent, operating through one of the ordinary functions of animal life."42  In a 
conclusion that still should have relevance today, the court said, "Neither the natural functions of 
an animal upon which or through which it may be designed to operate, nor any of the useful 
purposes to which it may be applied, can form any essential parts of the combination 
[constituting the claimed invention], however they may illustrate and establish its usefulness."43 
In 1874 in American Wood Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., the Supreme Court 
held that a patent involving a substance found in nature is invalid because it is not novel.44  
Specifically, the patent claim was for ―a new article of manufacture, … a pulp suitable for  the 
manufacture of paper, made from wood or other vegetable substances, by boiling or other 
vegetable substance in alkali under pressure, substantially as described.‖45  The Court said, 
―There are many things well known and valuable in medicine or in the arts which may be 
extracted from diverse substances. But the extract is the same, no matter from what it has been 
                                                          
41Morton v. New York Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 882 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865) (the patent was for the use 
of ether for surgery on animals; specifically that "this well-known inhalation of well-known agents (in increased 
[sic] quantities) would produce a state of the animal analogous to complete intoxication accompanied with total 
insensibility to pain.").  
42
Id. at 883. 
43
Id. at 884 (emphasis added) (explaining "A discovery may be brilliant and useful, and not patentable. No matter 
through what long, solitary vigils, or by what importunate efforts, the secret may have been wrung from the bosom 
of Nature, or to what useful purpose it may be applied. Something more is necessary. The new force or principle 
brought to light must be embodied and set to work, and can be patented only in connection or combination with the 
means by which, or the medium through which, it operates.").   
44Am. Wood Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. 566 (1874).   
45
Id. at 577.  Since the patent claim discussed the process by which the claimed product was produced, the claimed 
patent might be described as a type of "product by process claim."  See Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 
111 U.S. 293, 310 (1884) ("Every patent for a product or composition of matter must identify it so that it can be 
recognized aside from the description of the process for making it, or else nothing can be held to infringe the patent 
which is not made by that process."); Atlantic Thermoplastics Co., Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 841-42, 846-
47 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("process terms in product-by-process claims serve as limitations in determining infringement.").   
But see American Wood Paper, 90 U.S. at 593, 596-607 (there was separately a process claim at issue). 
 




taken.‖46  The Court concluded that the product found in nature, cellulose, previously had been 
obtained from other products, such as straw, wood and other vegetable substances, so "whatever 
may be said of their process for obtaining it, the product was in no sense new.  The reissued 
patent . . . is, therefore, void for want of novelty."47 
Regardless of whether the invention in American Wood Paper was directly made from a 
―natural‖ product (all manufactures at some level arise from nature),48 the case involved a 
comparison of a building block in nature – cellulose – with the claimed patented product.49  The 
holding on lack of novelty is consistent and interchangeable with the argument that building 
blocks of nature are not patentable, either because building blocks of nature are not patentable 
subject matter or because manmade copies of them are not new. 
In Cochrane v. Badische Anlin and Soda Farik, a case involving a patent for an 
"improvement in dyes or coloring matter from anthracine,"50 the Supreme Court first analyzed 
the claim as a product by process claim and said, “[U]nless it is shown that the process of No. 
                                                          
46
American Wood Paper, 90 U.S. at 593.  The Court added ―[w]hether a slight difference in the degree of purity of 
an article produced by several processes justifies denominating the products different manufactures, so that different 
patents may be obtained for each, may well be doubted, and it is not necessary to decide.‖. Id. at 594. 
47
Id. at 596.  The Court also observed that "[t]he substance of the products, therefore, was the same, and so were 
their uses. The design and the end of their production was the same, no matter how or from what they were 
produced.‖. Id. at 594.   
48In Funk Bros., Justice Frankfurter concurred with the result, but said, "[i]t only confuses the issue, however, to 
introduce such terms as ‗the work of nature‘ and the ‗laws of nature.‘  ....  Everything that happens may be deemed 
‗the work of nature,‘ and any patentable composite exemplifies in its properties ‗the laws of nature." 333 U.S. 127, 
134-35 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (Of course that statement is true in one sense, but lightening would more easily 
be accepted as a direct work of nature than the light emanating from a light bulb, which is a product of humans that 
take into account the laws of nature.). 
49John M. Conley & Roberte Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as a 
Barrier to Biotechnology Patents (Part I), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 301, 328 n. 193 (2003) (Conley 
and Makowski say American Wood Paper was ―not really [a] product of nature case…. [but] involved a substance 
previously derived from other commercial processes.‖).  
50Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 294 (1884) The Court said "[t]he claim of No. 4,321 is 
as follows: ‗Artificial alizarine, produced from anthracine or its derivatives by either of the methods herein 
described, or by any other method which will produce a like result.‘" Id. at 296. And also "Anthracene is one of a 
group of chemicals called polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, PAHs for short. .... Like most PAHs, anthracene is 
used to make dyes, plastics and pesticides."). Id.; See also Anthrazine Fact Sheet at 
www.epa.gov/osw/hazard/wastemin/minimize/factshts/anthrace.pdf (last visited June 11, 2011). 
 




4,321 was followed to produce the defendant‘s article, or unless it is shown that that article could 
not be produced by any other process, the defendant‘s article cannot be identified as the product 
of the process of No. 4,321."51  The Court determined that the allegedly infringing product had 
not been produced by the specific process identified in the patent.52  The Court then addressed 
"another view of the case," that "the article . . . was an old article."53  The Court concluded, 
"calling it [the invention] artificial alizarine did not make it a new composition of matter54   
Two additional nineteenth century patent cases also suggest that mankind cannot patent 
natural forces, at least without tying those forces to some useful mechanism that result in the 
force operating differently than it operates in nature.55  In Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone 
Co., the Supreme Court upheld Alexander Graham Bell's invention of the telephone, even though 
it used electricity, one of the forces of nature.56  The Court explained, "electricity, left to itself, 
will not do what is wanted.  The art consists in controlling the force [of nature] as to make it 
accomplish the purpose."57  The patent was valid, the Court explained, because "the claim is not 
for the use of a current of electricity in its natural state as it comes from the battery, but for 
putting a continuous current in a closed circuit, into a certain specified condition, suited to the 
transmission of vocal and other sounds, and using it in that condition for that purpose."58  Of 
                                                          
51
Cochrane, 111 U.S. at 310 (The Court continued that "the product itself could not be patented, even though it was 
a product made artificially for the first time, in contradistinction to being eliminated from the madder root."). 
52




Id. Compare Conley & Mackowski, supra note 49  at 328, n. 193, (refering to this view of the case as "effectively 
dictum.") with 111 U.S. at 313 (in which the Court did not choose between the two views of the case when it stated 
that, "In either view the decree of the circuit court must be reversed," indicating neither view was dictum  
55
See Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework For Patent Eligibility, 85 TUL. L. REV. 323, 370 ( 2010)  
(explaining one of these two cases - O'Reilly v. Morse - and saying, "to the extent a patent claim applies a natural 
principle to some specific end, the claim is eligible for patent consideration as long as the claim does not preempt all 
practical uses of the natural principle."). 




Id. at 783. 
 




course, in nature electricity does not arise from a battery.  The reference to "from the battery" in 
American Bell suggests that even when electricity is removed, or isolated, from its natural state, 
it was not patentable unless the inventor changed how the force - electricity - operated.59   
The Supreme Court upheld Samuel Morse's invention of the telegraph in O'Reilly v. 
Morse
60 but rejected his claim for the "use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current 
. . . electro-magnetism."61  In American Bell, the Court explained that the effect of Morse was 
"that the use of magnetism as a motive power, without regard to the particular process with 
which it was connected in the patent, could not be claimed, but that its use in that connection [a 
specified mechanical process] could."62  Although the Court said, "the [eighth] claim is too 
broad,"63 in the immediately following paragraph the court explained, "No one, we suppose will 
maintain that Fulton could have taken out a patent for his invention of propelling vessels by 
steam, describing the process and machinery he used, and claimed under it the exclusive right to 
use the motive power of the steam."   
The Court in Morse did not simply say there was a problem with the way the inventor 
wrote the eighth claim.  The Court indicated patents cannot capture physical phenomena such as 
electro-magnetism, in contrast to a machine that makes use of electro-magnetism.64 
                                                          
59Of course, that statement about "from the battery" was dicta, but since AMP1 and AMP2 are the first cases in 
which a court has directly ruled on the patentability of isolated DNA segments, it is appropriate to look at related 
situations, although they are not holdings. 
60O‘Reily v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
61
Id. at 86 ("‗Eighth. I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery, or parts of machinery, described in 
the foregoing specifications and claims; the essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of the 
electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed, for making or printing intelligible 
characters, letters, or signs, at any distances, being a new application of that power, of which I claim to be the first 
inventor or discovered.").   
62
Dolbear, 8 S. Ct. at 782. 
63
O’Reily, 56 U.S. at 113. 
64
See Jay Dratler, Jr., Alice In Wonderland Meets The U.S. Patent System, 38 AKRON L. REV. 299, 323 (2005)  
(suggesting that Morse was more than simply a disclosure case:  "how much coverage should a patent give a 
legitimate inventor who properly discloses what his invention is and how it works? Provide too little coverage and 
 




In Wall v. Leck, the Ninth Circuit ruled invalid a claim for the process of fumigating trees 
and plants in the absence of light.65  The court explained, "No natural function of the day or of 
the night, of the sun or of the moon, is patentable. These natural conditions are as free to all 
mankind as is the air we breathe."66  The court added, "A principle, considered as a natural 
physical force, is not the product of inventive skill. It is the common property of all mankind. It 
exists in nature independently of human effort, and can neither be diminished nor increased by 
human power."67 
 
2. Summary of nineteenth century cases 
 
What do these nineteenth century cases suggest about the patentability of products?  They 
reflect a general understanding of the courts that patents could not issue for products that 
previously existed in nature, without necessarily identifying whether the product was new or the 
subject matter was unpatentable.68  The cases also reflect a general understanding that patents 
could not issue for natural forces, such as magnetism, whether called natural or physical 
phenomena.  To avoid taking these cases into account would lead to the mistaken conclusion that 
the courts had expansively interpreted §101 and patentable subject matter without limits. 
In AMP2 the majority opinion only mentions Cochrane and American Wood Paper of the 
above cases and dismisses them by saying, "Other Supreme Court decisions cited by the parties 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
patents can be circumventable and therefore become devalued or worthless. Provide too much and you will thwart 
further progress in technology, as well as ―inventing around,‖ and the patentee will receive a windfall."). 
65Wall v. Leck, 66 F. 552, 553-54 (9th Cir. 1895). 
66
Id. at 557.   
67
Id. 
68Referring to Tatham, Morse, American Bell Tel. and a nineteenth century English patent case, Professor Parasidis 
says, "these early opinions dictate that a natural principle, in and of itself, is ineligible for patent protection because 
it may never be deemed to be new under the terms of the statute."  Parasidis, supra note 55,at 340.  
 




and amici were decided based on lack of novelty, not patentable subject matter."69  While it is 
true the Court rejected the patent claims in American Wood Paper due to lack of novelty, when 
the Supreme Court decided these cases, novelty and subject matter were part of the same 
statute.70  Also, the Court in noted in Cochrane, "Calling it artificial alizarine did not make it a 
new composition of matter."71  It is not clear the Supreme Court in either case was distinguishing 
between lack of novelty and an unpatentable composition of matter.   
 
B. Modification of Nature in the Twentieth Century 
 
In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court addressed the patentability of products in 
which the inventors had claimed they changed nature in significant ways to create patentable 
inventions.  Yet none of them hold or suggest that an inventor can patent a natural force - such as 
the coding properties of DNA segments - that operates through the invention in the same way as 
it operates in nature. 
 
1. American Fruit Growers, Inc. 
 
In American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., the Supreme Court addressed a product 
patent for "[f]resh citrus fruit of which the rind or skin carries borax in amount that is very small 
but sufficient to render the fruit resistant to blue mold decay."72  The issue was whether the 
claimed product was an article of manufacture.  The Court concluded the fruit was not an article 
                                                          
69
See AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1350, n. 6. 
70Yoon, supra note 9, at 960 ("A major change in the Patent Act of 1952 was the codification of conditions for 
patentability--novelty under section 102 and nonobviousness under section 103.  Prior to the Patent Act of 1952, the 
inquiry for patent eligible subject matter was intertwined with the inquiry for patentability."). 
71See infra text accompanying notes 50-54.  The Court earlier in the decision noted that "The answer also avers ‗that 
alizarine is a natural product, having a well-known definite constitution; that it is not a composition of matter, within 
the meaning of the statute, but has been well known in the arts, from time immemorial.'"  111 U.S. at 297. 
72283 U.S. 1, 6 (1931).  There was also a process claim involved in the opinion, and the process claim was rejected 
on the basis of lack of novelty.  Id. at 6, 13.  Brogdex Co. had sued American Fruit Growers, Inc. ("AFG") for 
shipping citrus fruit in violation of Brogdex Co.'s patent, and AFG admitted dipping the citrus fruit "in a borax 
solution in order to prevent or retard decay incident to growth of blue mold."  Id. at 10. 
 




of manufacture, because it did not possess "a new or distinctive form, quality or property."73  The 
Court cited two tariff cases on the meaning of an article of manufacture, and said, "There must 
be transformation; a new and different article must emerge 'having a distinctive name, character, 
or use.'"74 
The Supreme Court in American Fruit Growers rejected the analysis of the court of 
appeals that the product patent was valid because the complete article was not found in nature.75  
The Court explained, "The added substance only protects the natural article against deterioration 
by inhibiting development of extraneous spores upon the rind.  There is no change in the name, 
appearance, or general character of the fruit.  It remains a fresh orange, fit only for the same 
beneficial uses as theretofore."76 
In other words, in concluding that the patent claim did not recite an article of 
manufacture, the Supreme Court considered two issues:  the composition of the purported article 
of manufacture (an orange with borax inserted in the rind/skin) and the "beneficial uses" of the 
orange without borax added and with borax added.  The fact that the borax allowed the orange to 
stay fresh for a longer time than the natural article did not cause sufficient change to the orange 
to cause the orange with borax to constitute an article of manufacture. 
 
2. Funk Brothers Seed Co. 
 
In 1948, the Supreme Court directly addressed patentable subject matter and products of 
                                                          
73
Id.  at 11. 
74
Id. at 13 (citing Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. United States,. 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908) and Hartranft v. 
Wigemann, 212 U.S. 609, 613, 617 (1887)). 
75283 U.S. at 11. 
76
Id. at 11-12.  See Patenting, supra note 9, at 13 ("the Supreme Court decided that the addition of borax to the rind 
of an orange to increase its longevity did not confer a patentable distinction, when compared to an unadulterated 
orange, to create an article of manufacture."). 
 




nature in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.77  Kalo Inoculant had sued Funk Bros. 
for infringement of Kalo Inoculant's patent for an inoculant78 of bacteria for leguminous plants, 
and Funk Brothers responded that the patent was invalid.79   
Different Rhizobium bacteria promoted growth in different legumes, but when mixed 
together, the experience of mixing different bacteria inhibited the positive growth effects of each 
other on the legumes.80  Bond, the inventor, however, determined certain bacteria could be mixed 
together without the inhibiting effect, and he provided to the public a mixture of certain bacteria 
for use with several different species of legumes.81  The Supreme Court rejected the conclusions 
of the circuit court that the inventor (1) "did much more than discover a law of nature" and (2) 
"made a new and different composition of non-inhibitive strains which contributed utility and 
economy to the manufacture and distribution of commercial inoculants."82   
Referring to the bacteria, the Supreme Court concluded, "Their qualities are the work of 
nature.  Those qualities are of course not patentable."83  It is apparent the qualities of the bacteria 
the Court was considering were the external effects of the bacteria (not the composition of the 
bacteria), since the Court explained, "Bond does not create state of inhibition or of non-inhibition 
                                                          
77333 U.S. 127 (1948).  The issue in Funk Bros. was not "whether the methods of selecting and testing the non-
inhibitive strains are patentable. We have here only product claims."  Id. at 130.    
78"Inoculation is the process of introducing commercially prepared rhizobia bacteria into the soil" to promote 
nitrogen fixation.  "Legumes have the unique ability to form a symbiotic relationship with rhizobia (Rhizobium and 
Bradyrhizobium) bacteria to convert atmospheric nitrogen gas to ammonia nitrogen, a form usable by the plant. This 
relationship occurs in specialized root tissue called nodules."  Examples of legumes are alfalfa and soybeans.  See 
Colorado State University Fact Sheet on Legume Seed Inoculants,  
http://www.ext.colostate.edu/pubs/crops/00305.html (last visited Oct. 7,,2011). 
79What the Court described as illustrative was the following claim:  "An inoculant for leguminous plants comprising 
a plurality of selected mutually non-inhibitive strains of different species of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium, said 
strains being unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in the leguminous plant for which 
they are specific." Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 127, n. 1. 
80
Id. at 129. 
81
Id. Whether or not the process for selecting and testing non-inhibitive strains was patentable was not an issue in 
the case.  Id. at 130. 
82
Id.at 130-31. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 161 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir. 1947). 
83333 U.S. at 130. 
 




in the bacteria."84  The Court added, "The qualities of those bacteria, like the heat of the sun, 
electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men" and 
added they were "manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
none."85 
Funk Brothers supports the principle that in determining whether a composition is 
patentable subject matter, a court must consider not only the material in the composition but also 
the effect of that composition, such as the qualities of inhibition and non-inhibition of the 
bacteria86 A claim to a force of nature manifested in its natural way in a physical object 
constitutes an unpatentable phenomenon.87   
As the Supreme Court in Funk Brothers explained, "The combination of species produces 
no new bacteria, no change in the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of 
their utility. Each species has the same effect it always had. The bacteria perform in their natural 
way."88  Both composition and function of the claimed subject matter are relevant to determining 
patentable subject matter. 





86[T]o "take nitrogen form the air and fix it in the plant for conversion to organic nitrogenous compounds" needed 
for the growth of the plant. Id. at 128-30.   
87
Id. at 130 ("He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it"). The 
Supreme Court also concluded "that the product claims do not disclose an invention or discovery within the meaning 
of the patent statutes,"  Id. at 132. This statement seems to refer to the principle that a machine or manufacture that 
takes into account a law of nature or physical phenomenon can still constitute patentable subject matter, if hte 
phenomenon is no longer acting in its natural way.  See Conley & Makowski, supra note 49, at 334 (―Bond [the 
inventor] failed because  his real and only discovery was the product of nature, which he applied in the most obvious 
way possible: exactly as he found it.  In other words, his patent was denied because his purported ‗application‘ was 
not materially distinguishable from the work of nature.").   
88333 U.S. at 131. See also Patenting, supra note 9, at 13-14 ("The inventor's focus on the natural non-inhibition 
actually worked to deny a patent....The Court's decision also described the inventor's work as the 'discovery of some 
of the handiwork of nature.'").  There is disagreement on the holding in Funk Bros., as Professors Conley Makowski 
discuss in Conley & Makowski, supra note 49, at 333 ("the case can be plausibly read as turning not so much on the 
involvement of a product of nature as on the inventor‘s failure to apply the ―work of nature‖ in an non-obvious 
way." (citing Chisum, supra note 14, at 1-43)). For what Professors Conley and Makowski believe is the "fairer 
characterization" of Funk Bros., see infra text accompanying note 132. 
 







In a five to four decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court ultimately held 
that a live, "human-made" micro-organism (a type of bacterium not occurring in nature because 
of insertion into the bacteria by humans of four plasmids) constituted patentable subject matter.89  
The sole issue in Chakrabarty was whether the bacteria constituted patentable subject matter.90 
The Supreme Court said it "must determine whether respondent‘s micro-organism 
constitutes a 'manufacture' or 'composition of matter' within the meaning of the statute."91  The 
Court first recognized broad definitions of "manufacture"92 and "composition of matter,"93  but at 
the same time recognized limits to patentable subject matter.  Specifically, the Court stated, 
 
 The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not 
patentable . . . . Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found 
in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent 
his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of 
gravity. 94[S]uch discoveries are manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and 
                                                          
89
Diamond, 447 U.S. at 305.  See also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 968-971 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (discussing the facts in 
Chakrabarty).  The product claim in Chakrabarty was for ―a bacterium from the genus Pseudomonas containing 
therein at least two stable energy-generating plasmids, each of said plasmids providing a separate hydrocarbon 
degradative pathway.‖  447 U.S. at 305.  The Court explained that "Plasmids are hereditary units physically separate 
from the chromosomes of the cell" that had the capability in certain combinations to degrade crude oil in oil spills.  
Id. at n.1.  The Court noted, "This case does not involve the other 'conditions and requirements‘ of the patent laws, 
such as novelty and nonobviousness.‖  Id. at n. 5 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103).  In dissent, and speaking for 
Justices White, Marshall and Powell, Justice Brennan said, "The only question we need decide is whether Congress . 
. . intended that he [the inventor] be able to secure a monopoly on the living organism itself, no matter how 
produced or how used.  Because I believe the Court has misread the applicable legislation, I dissent."  447 U.S. at 
318 
90447 U.S. at 305 ("We granted certiorari to determine whether a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable 
subject matter."). 
91
Id. at 307. Finding patentable subject matter, the Court did not state whether the bacteria was a manufacture or a 
composition of matter.  Id. at 307-09. 
92
Id. at 308 (quoting Am. Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 11.) See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.  
93
Id. at 308 (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F.Supp. 279, 280 (D.C. 1957)). 
94
Id. at 309 (The Court did not define "physical  phenomena.").  Parasidis, supra note 55, at 326, 332-33 (citing 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) for the proposition that the product of nature doctrine "precludes 
eligibility for laws of nature, phenomenon, mental processes, and abstract ideas.").  The Court in Gottschalk did 
refer to "natural phenomenon" as being unpatentable. See Diamond, 450 U.S. at 185 ("Excluded from such patent 
protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.");  see also Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303 (used 
"physical phenomena" as the type of phenomena that constituted unpatentable subject matter.).  This article uses 
 




reserved exclusively to none.95 
 
The Court in Chakrabarty upheld the patent and concluded "the patentee has produced a 
new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one having 
the potential for significant utility. His discovery is not nature‘s handiwork, but his own; 
accordingly it is patentable subject matter under §101."96  The Court explained the differences 
between the natural bacteria and the claimed invention in the second paragraph of the decision:  
"This human-made, genetically engineered bacterium is capable of breaking down multiple 
components of crude oil.  Because of this property, which is possessed by no naturally occurring 
bacteria, Chakrabarty‘s invention is believed to have significant value for the treatment of oil 
spills."97  In other words, as in Funk Brothers, the Court again indicated that comparison of the 
function of the claimed invention to the natural function of the analogous composition was 
relevant.98 
It appears the Court in Chakrabarty referred to "phenomena" as the actions and natural 
functioning of the bacteria that had not been changed by humans to include plasmids.  Before the 
insertion of the plasmids, the bacteria did not break down oil spills, but after the insertion the 
bacteria, the bacteria did break down oil spills.  Humans changed the physical 
phenomena/functioning of the bacteria.99 
Additionally, the Court held "that the relevant distinction was not between living and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
"physical phenomenon" for the phenomena that are unpatentable, because that is the most current term used by the 
Supreme Court and because it expressly covers physical objects, and not simply abstract phenomena, consistent with 
prior Supreme Court cases.  See supra notes 50-54, 72-76, 77-88 and accompanying text. 
95447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Funk Bros, 333 U.S. at 130 (1948)). 
96
Id. at 310 (emphasis added) (The Court did not discuss a standard for determining "markedly different."). 
97
Id.at 305. 
98Professors Conley and Makowski state that the ―principal distinction‖ between Funk and Chakrabarty  ―appears to 
be that the Funk inventor did his work by   mixing cells, whereas Chakrabarty had to introduce new genetic material 
within a cell.‖.  Conley & Makowski, supra note 49, at 376. 
99447 U.S. at 304. 
 




inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made 
inventions."100  Since the Court also held laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas 
were not patentable, the reference to "products of nature" being on the unpatentable side of the 
divide from human-made inventions indicates the Court considered "products of nature" to be a 
short-hand term for laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas.101 
The Supreme Court followed its statement in Chakrabarty that "laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable" with citation to five earlier 
Supreme Court decisions: Parker v. Flook; Gottschalk v. Benson; Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. 
Kalo Inoculant Co.; O'Reilly v. Morse; and Le Roy v. Tatham.102  The phrase "physical 
phenomena" does not appear in Gottschalk, Funk Brothers, O'Reilly or Tatham, but it does 
appear in the dissenting opinion in Parker. Further, "natural phenomena" are discussed in the 
majority opinion, therefore it is appropriate to turn to Parker to confirm the meaning of 
unpatentable "phenomena."103 
                                                          
100
Id.at 313.  See J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001) (holding that the Plant 
Variety Protection Act and the Plant Patent Act of 1930 were not the exclusive means of obtaining a patent for 
human-developed plant breeds and confirming that the distinction the Court considered crucial under §101 was 
between "products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions," (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303 (1980))). See also 534 U.S. at 127-128 ("Pedigree inbred corn plants are developed by crossing corn 
plants with desirable characteristics and then inbreeding the resulting plants for several generations until the 
resulting plant line is homogenous.  Inbreds are often weak and have a low yield; their value lies primarily in their 
use for making hybrids. . . . . Hybrid seeds are produced by crossing two inbred corn plants and are especially 
valuable because they produce strong and vibrant hybrid plants with selected highly desirable characteristics.").  See 
generally Plant Variety Protection Act,7 U.S.C. § 2321 (2006) and Plant Protection Act  35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 
(2006).   
101Abstract ideas do not seem to fit nicely into a "product of nature" category.  However, perhaps the Court thought 
of abstract ideas as "products of nature," to the extent the Court considers human beings - presumably the generator 
of such ideas - products of nature. 
102447 U.S. at 309.  Even though the results of Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty were different, Professors Conley and 
Makowski say the analysis in Chakrabarty shows that the Court believed Funk Bros. was "the definitive statement of 
the product of nature doctrine."  Conley & Makowski, supra note 49, at 376. 
103Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (deciding that a method for updating alarm limits during catalytic 
conversion did not constitute patentable subject matter. The Court agreed the method in question was a "process" in 
the ordinary sense of the word, but concluded that its prior holding foreclosed "a literal reading of §101" as to the 
meaning of "process" for determining patentability.)  Id. at 585, 588-89 (citing Gottschalk, 409 U.S. 63). 
 




The majority and dissent in Parker agreed on what in general did not constitute 
patentable subject matter. The majority wrote, "Phenomena of nature ...mental processes, and 
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work."104  The dissent in Parker started with a direct reference to "physical 
phenomena" and stated, "It is a commonplace that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas are not patentable subject matter," the exact three terms used in Chakrabarty and 
Bilski to describe the three categories of unpatentable subject matter.105  The examples of 
unpatentable subject matter mentioned by the dissent included both abstract concepts and 
physical matters:  law of gravity, multiplication tables, magnetism, and "the fact that water at sea 
level boils at 100 degrees centigrade and freezes at zero."  Presumably the dissent in Parker - 
and there is no reason to conclude the majority disagreed - classified (1) the law of gravity as a 
law of nature, (2) multiplication tables as an abstract idea, and (3) magnetism and water boiling 
or freezing as physical phenomena.   
 
4. Lower court purification cases 
 
There were references in AMP2 to some of a series of lower federal courts in the 
twentieth century (largely decided before Funk Brothers and Chakrabarty), that involved the 
patentability of "purified" products -- material found in nature mixed together with other material 
from which the inventor had removed much or all of the other material or "impurities."106  Is 
purification the kind of human intervention into naturally occurring products that the Supreme 
                                                          
104
Id. at 589 (quoting Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67). 
105
Id. at 598. 
106
Patenting, supra note 9, at 14 ("The defendants [in AMP] argued . . . that the isolation and purification of a DNA 
molecule constitutes an alteration from the natural state, and as such, the DNA is no longer the natural product.  
Although the weight of the Supreme Court decisions forbids the patenting of naturally-derived products, proponents 
of patenting genes and other biomolecules base their arguments on lower court cases."). 
 




Court in Chakrabarty contemplated as the dividing between patentable and unpatentable subject 
matter?107  As some of these cases are mentioned in AMP2, this article summarizes those cases 
here. 
The courts rejecting patents on "purified" products considered more than comparing the 
chemical composition of the "purified" products with what was found in nature--the courts also 
considered the functioning use of the products.108  For instance, in General Electric Co. v. De 
Forest Radio Co.,109 the court rejected product claims for substantially pure tungsten, since 
purified tungsten was ductile and could be shaped into wires for electric light bulbs, the same use 
as elemental tungsten, even though the form of tungsten that existed in nature is oxide of 
tungsten (WO 3), a highly brittle material.110  The court addressed the phrase "having ductility 
and high tensile strength,‖ holding the phrase was just an accurate description of substantially 
pure tungsten.  The court concluded claim 26 "claims as an invention a product of nature in the 
form of a chemical element for which a product claim as distinguished from a process claim 
cannot be validly awarded."111 
Similarly, the courts upholding patents on purified products relied on not just the 
                                                          
107
Patenting, supra note 9, at 13 ("what level of human intervention makes a product not natural, and court opinions 
diverge on when a product is significantly altered from its natural state to legitimize eligibility."). 
108
See Allen K. Yu, Why It Might Be Time To Eliminate Genomic Patents, Together With The Natural Extracts 
Doctrine Supporting Such Patents, 47 IDEA 659, 694 (2007) ("Under the natural extracts doctrine products 
extracted from nature constitute patentable subject matter as long as the extraction involves human intervention and 
the  isolated product offers novel properties unavailable in the natural form."). 
109Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1928). 
110
Id. at 641-43; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 17 F.2d 90, 92 (D. Del. 1927), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1928) ("Tungsten is one of the elements.  In nature it is found only in combination with 
other elements. . . . Throughout the century preceding the granting of the patent in issue, chemists and metallurgists 
asserted that tungsten hot or cold is nonductile."). 
111
Id. at 643.  Accord Parasidis, supra note 55, at 348 ("The General Electric case is particularly noteworthy because 
of the fact that the court held that the claims were invalid despite the fact that tungsten did not exist in nature in its 
pure form. In particular, the court reasoned that, because tungsten is a naturally occurring element, all of its 
properties are natural by definition.‖) and Conley & Makowski, supra note 49, at 324 (―The most controversial 
aspect of the General Electric decision arises from the fact that the pure tungsten claimed by Coolidge had not been 
found in nature.").   
 




chemical composition of the products, but their uses.  In Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford 
Co.,112 the courts upheld a patent for a product of extracts from the suprarenal glands of living 
animals, because the purification created a new product different in therapeutic effect from the 
natural material.113  In Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., the Fourth Circuit 
reversed the holding of the district court that the product claims for a Vitamin B(12) was 
unpatentable as a product of nature,114 again because of the additional  therapeutic effects of the 
invention.115  Two cases involving patents for isolated DNA segments – Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai 
                                                          
112189 F. 95 (Cir. Ct., S.D.N.Y. 1911); aff'd in part and rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).  The first claim of 
the first of the two patents at issue read:  "A substance possessing the herein-described physiological characteristics 
and reactions of the suprarenal glands in a stable and concentrated form, and practically free from inert and 
associated gland tissue."   196 F. at 497. 
113
See, e.g., Jonah D. Jackson, Something Like The Sun: Why Even 'Isolated And Purified' Genes Are Still Products 
Of Nature, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1453, 1468-69 (2011) ("Finding that the claimed substance was different both in 
chemical composition . . .  and in therapeutic effect . . . Judge Hand called these differences ―not in degree, but in 
kind‖ and therefore patentable exceptions to the product of nature doctrine.").    See generally University of Medical 
Center Endocrinology Health Guide, http://www.umm.edu/endocrin/adrengl.htm (last visited June 11, 2011) 
(Adrenal glands, "which are also called suprarenal glands, are small, triangular glands located on top of both kidneys 
. . . The adrenal cortex, the outer portion of the adrenal gland, secretes hormones that have an effect on the body's 
metabolism, on chemicals in the blood, and on certain body characteristics.").    
114Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 157-60 (4th Cir. 1958) (Claim 1 of the patent read:  
"A vitamin B(12)-active composition comprising recovered elaboration products of the fermentation of a vitamin 
B(12)-activity producing strain of Fungi selected from the class consisting of Schizomycetes, Torula, and 
Eremothecium, the L.L.D. activity of said composition being at least 440 L.L.D. units per milligram and less than 11 
million L.L.D. units per milligram." The Fourth Circuit said, "The claims of this patent do not reach pure, crystalline 
vitamin B(12), for they are restricted to compositions having a maximum LLD activity which is less than that of the 
pure substance. The claims do not cover vitamin B(12) compositions derived from liver or any source other than the 
specified fermentates. Nor do the claims extend to compositions of such low activity as to be of no commercial or 
therapeutic value. They do cover B(12)-active compositions derived from the specified fermentates, which, beyond 
question, are of very great therapeutic and commercial importance.").  
115
Id. at 162-163 (the Fourth Circuit relied on the functioning of the invention, not simply its chemical composition, 
in concluding, "[t]he new product . . .  had such advantageous characteristics as to replace the liver products."  The 
Fourth Circuit also said "[a] product of nature which is not a ‗new and useful machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter‘ is not patentable, for it is not within the statutory definition of those things which may be patented. Even 
though it be a new and useful composition of matter it still may be unpatentable if the subject matter as a whole was 
obvious within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103, or if other conditions of patentability are not satisfied.  In dealing 
with such considerations, unpatentable products have been frequently characterized as ‗products of nature.‘‖ (citing 
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948)); see also Jackson supra note 133 at 1469 ("The 
effects of the purified B12 were different than those of any previously known compound-- a difference in kind, not 
merely in degree of purity.").    In analyzing Merck, Professors Conley and Makowski said that "one wonders 
whether it is being suggested that great utility, standing alone, can trump product of nature status.‖   Conley & 
Makowski, supra note 49, at 328-329.  In any case, the effects of the product are relevant to patentability. 
 





116 and Intervet Inc. v Merial Ltd.117 – but neither Amgen nor Intervet 
included a holding on whether isolated DNA segments could constitute patentable subject 
matter.  Intervet is particularly interesting due to the separate opinion of Judge Dyk, concurring 
in part and dissenting in part "to make clear that in construing the claims, we are not deciding 
that the claims as construed are limited to patentable subject matter." 118  Patentable subject 
matter was not at issue or ruled upon.119 
Judge Dyk observed that although the Federal Circuit had upheld several gene patents, 
neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit had "directly decided the issue of the 
patentability of isolated DNA molecules."120  The majority did not disagree with that statement.  
Judge Dyk made three comments summarizing his reasoning that at least one claim of the patent 
                                                          
116Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., CIV. A. No. 87–2617–Y, 1989 WL 169006, at *32  (D. Mass. 
Dec. 11, 1989), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that "claim 2 of the patent is 
the 'purified and isolated' DNA sequence encoding human erythropoietin‖) Id. at *32 .  Defendants challenged the 
validity of the patent, but did not claim the patent constituted unpatentable subject matter, and the District Court 
upheld the validity of most of the patent claims. Defendant challenged the validity of the patent on grounds of 
anticipation under §102 by a Dr. Fritsch, obviousness under §103, failure to comply with the best mode requirement 
of §112 and failure to comply with the enablement requirement of §112.  Id. at *86 (summary of the court's 
conclusions). In dicta, the District Court made the following statement:  "The invention claimed in the '08 patent is  
not as plaintiff argues the DNA sequence encoding human EPO since that is a nonpatentable natural phenomenon 
'free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.'" Id. at *32 (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130).  On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit in Amgen reversed the District Court and held that certain of the patent claims had not been enabled 
by the patent specification. The Federal Circuit added, "we do not intend to imply that generic claims to genetic 
sequences cannot be valid where they are of a scope appropriate to the invention disclosed by an applicant." 
However, there was no holding by the Federal Circuit that isolated DNA segments constituted patentable subject 
matter.  927 F.2d at 1212-1214(holding that the patent specification had not enabled claims 7, 8, 23-27 and 29 of the 
'008 patent.).  JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 103 (3rd ed., Aspen Publishers 2009) (Under the enablement 
provision in §112, "an inventor must disclose  [in the patent application] both 'how  to make' the invention as well as 
'how to use' it."). 
117Intervet, Inc. v. Merial, Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282, 1292-96 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dky, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
118
Id. at 1292 (Dyk, J., concurring);  Id. at 1284, 1286 (discussing Intervet‘s filing of a declaratory judgment action 
asking the court to declare that Intervet was not infringing the patens of defendant Merial.  One of the product 
claims was for "[a]n isolated DNA molecule comprising a nucleotide sequence encoding an epitope which is 
specific to PCV-2 and not specific to PCV-1."  The District Court granted summary judgment of non-infringement.  
Invervet, Inc., v. Merial, Ltd., 643 F. Supp. 2d. 97 (D.D.C. 2009) vacated sub. nom., Intervet, Inc. v. Merial, Ltd., 
617 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  The Federal Circuit reversed the District Court's claim construction and remanded 
for a determination if the accused product infringed the claims as constructed.  Intervet, 617 F.3d at 1292.   
118Intervet, 617 F.2d  at 1287, n. 4. 
119Intervet, 617 F.2d  at 1287, n. 4  
120
Id. at 1293 (Dyk, J., concurring). 
 




raised "substantial issues of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101:"121 
 
 "[A]llowing the patenting of naturally occurring substances [would] 
preempt the use by others of substances that should be freely available 
to the public."122 
 
 "[I]n order for a product of nature to satisfy section 101, it must be 
qualitatively different from the product occurring in nature, with 
'markedly different characteristics from any found in nature.' It is far 
from clear that an 'isolated' DNA sequence is qualitatively different 
from the product occurring in nature such that it would pass the test 
laid out in Funk Brothers and Chakrabarty."123 
 
 "The mere fact that such a DNA molecule does not occur in isolated 
form in nature does not, by itself, answer the question [of patentable 
subject matter].  It would be difficult to argue, for instance, that one 
could patent the leaves of a plant merely because the leaves do not 
occur in nature in their isolated form."124   
Explaining why it was not deciding the issue of patentable subject matter, the majority said, 
"[w]e do not address the issues of validity and non-patentable subject matter discussed by the 
dissent because these issues were not addressed by the district court or raised on appeal."125 
 
5. Summary of twentieth century cases 
 
In determining whether a claimed invention contains patentable subject matter, the 
Supreme Court considers not only the composition, but the characteristics and functioning of 
both the invention and the related natural product.  In American Fruit Growers the Supreme 
Court concluded that the fact that borax, when inserted into the orange, increased the life of the 
orange, was not sufficient for patentability, because the orange remained "fit only for the same 
                                                          
121
Id. at 1292-93 (Dyk, J., concurring) ("The question is whether the isolated DNA molecule, separate from any 
applications [i.e., uses] associated with the isolated nucleotide sequence (for example, the production of a vaccine) is 
patentable subject matter.").  
122
Id. at 1294 (Dyk, J, concurring). 
123
Id. at 1294-1295 (Dyk, J., concurring). 
124Intervet, 617 F.3d at 1295 (Dyk, J., concurring). 
125
Id. at 1287, n. 4. 
 




beneficial uses as theretofore."126  In Funk Bros., the Court concluded that since there had been 
no change in the "state of inhibition or of non-inhibition in the bacteria," the bacteria were 
"manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none."127  In 
Chakrabarty, the Court held that the bacteria constituted patentable subject matter because "the 
patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in 
nature and one having the potential for significant utility;"128 specifically, "[t]his human-made, 
genetically engineered bacterium is capable of breaking down multiple components of crude 
oil."129 
Put another way, the Supreme Court considers whether the claimed invention has 
changed the work of nature--the natural or physical phenomena.  If not, the invention does not 
claim patentable subject matter.  Professor Parasidis wrote, "Claims over purified or isolated 
stem cells are ineligible where . . . natural properties of the cells are the proximate cause of any 
distinction between the subject matter of the isolated or purified stem cell from the non-isolated 
or non-purified cells."130  Specifically discussing Funk Bros., Professor Kane wrote 'No human 
intervention accounted for the properties exhibited by the bacteria, and the Court separated 
discovery from invention."131  Also discussing Funk Bros., Professors Conley and Makowski 
wrote that the "fairer characterization of the holding is that Bond failed because his real and only 
discovery was the product of nature, which he applied in the most obvious way possible: exactly 
as he found it. In other words, his patent was denied because his purported ―application‖ was not 
                                                          
126283 U.S. at 11-12. 
127333 U.S. at 130. 
128447 U.S. at 310. 
129
Id. at 305. 
130Paradisis, supra note 55, at 402-403 (emphasis added) (discussing purified and isolated stem cells instead of 
isolated and purified DNA segments, Professor Paradisis analyzed the same cases as set forth in this section, and her 
conclusion also seems applicable to isolated and purified DNA segments). 
131
Splitting, supra note 33, at 734 (emphasis added). 
 




materially distinguishable from the work of nature."132  As discussed next, however, the Majority 
Opinion disregards the work of nature, the natural properties of the DNA segments. 
 
III. ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY vs. U.S. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE
133
 and MYRIAD GENETICS, INC. 
 
The Majority Opinion and Concurring Opinion together focus on three issues:  (a) 
comparing the chemical compositions of the isolated DNA segments with the entire DNA 
strands and chromosomes rather than with the individual gene; (b) the utility to humans of some 
of the short isolated DNA segments; and (c) the fact the USPTO had been granting "gene 
patents" for years.134  This article examines these issues, but first discusses the representative 
patent claims in the case. 
 
A. The Representative Patents 
 
AMP2 involves both process and product patents, and there are three representative 
product claims.  The first claim for the ‗282 patent is:135  "An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 
polypeptide, said polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2."136  
The second claim for the ‗282 patent is the following dependent claim:  "The isolated DNA of 
claim 1, wherein said DNA has the nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQW ID NO;1.137  The 5th 
claim for the ‗282 patent is:"An isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of 
                                                          
132
Rethinking1, supra note 49, at 334 (Emphasis added).  For the view of Funk Bros. that Professors Conley and 
Makowski did not agree with, see supra note 88.  
133The District Court granted the USPTO's motion for judgment on the constitutional issue raised against the 
USPTO.  See supra note 9. 
134Judge Moore also referred to prior litigation involving DNA (which did not involve any holding that isolated 
DNA segments constituted patentable subject matter), settled expectations, extensive property rights, and inaction of 
Congress,  all discussed in part B below. 
135The Majority Opinion identified the other patents assigned to Myriad in AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1334. 








claim 1."138  These claims give Myriad the right to sue anyone that uses the segments identified, 
regardless of how the other party made the segments.139 
The ‗282 Patent defines an "isolated . . . nucleic acid" as "one which is substantially 
separated from other cellular components which naturally accompany a native human sequence 
or protein . . . ."140  The ‗282 Patent says a "polynucleotide is said to 'encode' a polypeptide if, in 
its native state or when manipulated by methods well known to those skilled in the art, it can be 
transcribed and/or translated to produce the mRNA for the polypeptide or a fragment thereof."141 
The size of the BRCA1 gene varies significantly depending on whether it is in native or 
isolated form.  The BRCA1 gene in its native state contains around eighty million nucleotides.  
The isolated BRCA1 gene with both exons and introns consists of approximately 80,000 
nucleotides.  Without introns, BRCA1 has around 5,500 nucleotides.142 
This article only addresses the decision in AMP2 holding that claim 1 of the '282 patent 
constitutes patentable subject matter.  Claim 2 involves cDNA143 and the facts specific to cDNA, 
and the three judges in AMP2 agreed that this claim involved patentable subject matter.144  Claim 
5 can include much shorter segments of DNA than claims 1 and 2,145 and the argument that claim 
                                                          
138
Id. The Majority Opinion refers to these three claims as "representative composition claims" in AMP2, 653 F.3d at 
1334. 
139For comparisons of product patents, process patents and product by process patents, see Robert P. Merges & 
Richard R. Nelson, On The Complex Economics Of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 851-852 ( 1990); see 
Laurie L. Hill, The Race to Patent the Genome: Free Riders, Hold Ups, and the Future of Medical Breakthroughs, 
11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 221, 233-34 (2003);,Nese, supra note 5, at 148-49.  For further discussion of "product 
by process" claims, see notes 191-194 below and accompanying text. 
140




AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1351-52 . 
143
See Id. at 1364. 
144The failure of this article to address whether claim 2 or claim 5 recite patentable subject matter does not indicate 
agreement or disagreement with the result in AMP2 on claim 2 or on claim 5.     
145
See, e.g., AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1364. 
 




1 does not constitute patentable subject matter presents the issue of patentable subject matter 
more clearly than does claim 5.146  
 
B. Is Isolated DNA Markedly Different than the Native DNA? 
 
1. Looking solely at chemical composition 
 
In AMP1 the District Court referred to genes as "basic units of heredity found in all living 
organisms,"147 but Judges Lourie and Moore both looked past these basic units.  Judge Lourie 
said, ―Native DNA exists in the body as one of forty-six large, contiguous DNA molecules.  
Each DNA molecule is itself an integral part of a larger structural complex, a chromosome.  In 
each chromosome, the DNA molecule is packaged around histone proteins into a structure called 
chromatin, which in turn is packaged into the chromosomal structure.‖148  Judge Moore 
concentrated on the individual chemical bonds remaining after isolation of one gene from other 
genes, saying ―Instead of being connected to many thousands of additional nucleotides at the 3‘ 
and 5‘ ends of the sequence in question, as is the case in the chromosome, the isolated DNA 
molecules terminate in, for example, a hydroxyl and a phosphate group, respectively.‖149   The 
paths of Judges Lourie and Moore diverged on the relevance of the difference in functioning 




                                                          
146The comparison of short and long DNA segments is discussed as part of this article's discussion of claim 1.  See 
text accompanying notes 159-166. 
147
AMP1, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 194. 
148
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1351.  (Judge Moore also referred to the connection of a specified gene to the other parts of 
the chromosome as significant and added, ―There are other differences between an isolated DNA sequence and that 
same DNA sequence as part of the chromosome.‖) Id. at 1363. 
149
Id. at 1363. (It is not clear why Judge and Moore did not go further in his comparison, since chromosomes are 
integral parts of a larger structural complex, cells.  Would Judge Moore have concluded that a chromosome removed 
from the cell constituted patentable subject matter?). 
 




2. Judge Lourie rejected considering uses/functioning of isolated DNA in 
determining whether the "invention" is markedly different than 
native DNA 
 
Although Judge Lourie referred to Myriad‘s argument that ―isolated DNAs, unlike native 
DNAs, can be used as primers and probes for diagnosing cancer,‖150 he did not rely on such uses 
to justify his conclusion the isolated DNA segments constituted patentable subject matter.  
Instead, he concluded that ―it is the distinctive nature of DNA molecules as isolated 
compositions of matter that determines their patent eligibility rather than their physiological use 
or benefit.‖151  Judge Lourie dismissed the importance of the identical nucleotide sequences by 
indicating the court must consider the differences  of the chemical compositions rather than the 
similarity of the genetic code--or the "information content" of the DNA (as Judge Lourie labeled 
the genetic code). 152   
Judge Lourie also rejected any consideration of the fact that both native DNA and the 
isolated DNA segments coded for the same polypeptides regardless of any difference in chemical 
composition.153  Specifically, he said, ―Uses of chemical substances may be relevant to the non-
obviousness of these substances or to method claims embodying those uses, but the patent 
eligibility of an isolated DNA is not negated because it has similar informational properties to a 
different, more complex natural material.‖154  Judge Lourie also said, ―[w]e recognize that 
                                                          
150
Id. at 1349. 
151
Id. at 1353. 
152
Id. ("Plaintiffs argue that because the claimed isolated DNAs retain the same nucleotide sequence as native 
DNAs, they do not have any 'markedly different' characteristics. This approach, however, looks not at whether 
isolated DNAs are markedly different—have a distinctive characteristic—from naturally occurring DNAs, as the 
Supreme Court has directed, but at one similarity: the information content contained in isolated and native DNAs‘ 
nucleotide sequence."). 
153Claim 1 of patent '282 is for "An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having the 
amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2."  See supra note 136.  Judge Moore noted in AMP2 at 1366, "Some 
of the claims at issue.... are genus claims, drafted broadly enough to include both short fragments as well as the 
entire isolated gene sequence.". 
154
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1353. 
 




biologists may think of molecules in terms of their uses, but genes are in fact materials having a 
chemical nature and, as such are best described in patents by their structures rather than their 
functions.‖
155    
Removing consideration of function from patentable subject matter and relegating 
function to the separate statutory question of non-obviousness under §103 or description under 
§112 is inconsistent with Chakrabarty and Flook Bros. 156  In Chakbrabarty the only issue was 
whether the bacteria constituted patentable subject matter.  In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court - 
in contrast to Judge Lourie - considered the uses of the bacteria in determining patentable subject 
matter, observing:  "This human-made, genetically engineered bacterium is capable of breaking 
down multiple components of crude oil."157  In Funk Bros., the Supreme Court invalidated the 
patent because there had been ―no enlargement of the range of their [the bacteria‘s] utility‖ and 
the ―bacteria perform in their natural way.‖158  In both cases the Supreme Court considered 
functioning of the product, in one finding patentable subject matter in one and the other not 
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Id. (emphasis added).  See Splitting, supra note 33, at 708 ("Genes are identified as the discrete units of DNA 
sequence that encode individual proteins and that collectively underlie the biochemical design of any organism."). 
HORTON, infra note 299 at 816 (defining the "genetic code" as "The correspondence between a particular nucleotide 
codon and the amino acid it specifies.  The standard genetic code of 64 codons is used by almost all organisms.  The 
genetic code is used to translate the sequence of nucleotides in mRNA into protein.");  See also notes 308-14. 
156§ 103(a) provides, " A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as 
set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior 
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by 
the manner in which the invention was made."  Paragraph 2 of § 112 provides,  "The specification shall conclude 
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention."  However, judges on the Federal Circuit in addition to Judge Lourie, have also written 
opinions recently appearing to diminish the exceptions to patentable subject matter under § 101.  For instance, in 
Classen Immunothererapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 2011 WL 3835409, the majority opinion, written by Judge 
Newman, referred to § 101 as a "course eligibility filter" and added the "patentability of subject matter that is 
facially within the classes set forth in §101 is most reliably resolved in accordance with the conditions of §§ 102, 
103 and 112."  Id. at *8  Also in Classen, Chief Judge Rader gave the following additional view, in which Judge 
Newman joined:  "This court should decline to accept invitations to restrict subject matter eligibility."  Id. at *15.  
Attempting to diminish the trilogy of exceptions appears inconsistent with the Supreme Courts affirmation in Bilski 
laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas have "defined the reach of the statute [§101] as a matter of 
statutory stare decisis going back 150 years."  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225. 
157447 U.S. at 304. 
158333 U.S. at 131. 
 




finding patentable subject matter in the other. 
 
3. Judge Moore did not identify any different use/functioning of the 
isolated segments of claim 1 from native DNA 
 
Judge Moore, on the other hand, did not disregard Chakrabarty or Funk Bros. and did 
consider the uses/functioning of the isolated DNA segments.  Judge Moore began by looking at 
claim 5 of the '282 patent:  "An isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 
1."159  With respect to those segments, Judge Moore found, "The shorter isolated DNA 
sequences . . . can be used as primers in a diagnostic screening process to detect gene mutations. 
These smaller isolated DNA sequences . . . can also be used as the basis for probes. Naturally 
occurring DNA cannot be used to accomplish these same goals.160  As a result, Judge Moore 
concluded that the shorter DNA segments of claim 5 had a "different and beneficial utility," and 
the "small segments are patentable subject matter."161 
Judge Moore took a different position with the longer segments, such as the segments of 
claim 1, which could be as long as 5,000 nucleotides, even with the introns removed.162  Relying 
on Funk Bros., she said, "Unlike the shorter strands of isolated DNA, the chemical and structural 
differences in the isolated gene do not clearly lead to an ‗enlargement of the range of . . . utility‘ 
as compared to nature."163  She made the following two observations: 
 
 "the full length gene is too large to be used as a probe."164 
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AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1334 (citing U.S. Patent No.5,747,282, at [153-54] (filed May 5, 1998)).  The Majority 
Opinion refers to these three claims as ―representative composition claims‖. Id. at 1365. 
160




Id. at 1366. 
163
Id. Similarly, Judge Bryson stated, "What is claimed in the BRCA genes is the genetic coding material, and that 
material is the same, structurally and functionally, in both the native gene and the isolated form of the gene."  Id. at 
1378. 
164
Id. at 1366. 
 




 Likewise, an entire isolated gene appears unsuitable for use as a primer in 
genetic screening for mutations in that same gene."165 
 
She concluded the paragraph by repeating that "the chemical and structural differences in an 
isolated DNA sequence which includes most or all of a gene do not clearly lead to significant 
new utility as compared to nature."166 
Judge Moore then stated, "If I were deciding this case on a blank canvas, I might 
conclude that an isolated DNA sequence that includes most or all of a gene is not patentable 
subject matter."167  However, she deferred to past events (discussed in part IIIC below) and 
concurred in the judgment of Judge Lourie with respect to isolated DNA sequences.168 
 
4. Judge Bryson's dissent that isolated DNA segments are not markedly 
different  
 
Judge Bryson rejected the foundation of Judge Lourie's position that removing the 
gene/DNA segment from the other genes/DNA segments and histones was significant for the 
issue of patentable subject matter.  He said, ―The only material change made to those genes from 
their natural state is the change that is necessarily incidental to the extraction of the genes from 
                                                          
165
AMP2, 653 F,3d at 1366.  Similarly, Judge Bryson said, "as Judge Moore‘s concurring opinion explains, Myriad 
has failed to credibly identify new uses for the isolated BRCA genes as probes or primers."  Id. at 1378. 
166
Id. at 1366.  Judge Moore added, "[w]hether an isolated gene is patentable subject matter depends on how much 
weight is allocated to the different structure as compared to the similarity of the function to nature." Id.  Yet his next 
sentence was, "If I were deciding this case on a blank canvas, I might conclude that an isolated DNA sequence that 
includes most or all of a gene is not patentable subject matter".  Id.  So it appears that whatever weight he assigned 
favored the conclusion that the isolated gene was not patentable.  More importantly, in American Fruit Growers, 
Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court focused on whether the claimed inventor added anything to the 
naturally occurring object (yes in American Fruit Growers and Chakrabarty and no in Funk Bros.), and if human 
beings had added something, did that addition change the functioning of the object (no in American Fruit Growers 
and yes in Chakrabarty).  In other words, the conclusion is that a change in composition was necessary, but the end 
question was whether there was a change in functioning, not a weighing of the additions to the composition vs. any 
change in function.  This conclusion fits with the statement in Chakrabarty that there was a change in composition 
and increased utility, or at least a potential for significantly increased utility.  See infra text accompanying note 177. 
167
AMP2, 653 F.ed at 1366. 
168
Id. at 1358.  Although this article focuses on claim 1, Judge Moore concurred with Judge Lourie's opinion with 
respect to all the method claims and the claims to isolated cDNA claims and concurred with the judgment with 
respect to the "remaining sequences."  Id. 
 




the environment in which they are found in nature.‖169  He added, ―[T]he process of extracting 
minerals, or taking cuttings from wild plants, like the process of isolating genetic material, can 
result in some physical or chemical changes to the natural substance,‖ but ―do not make 
extracted minerals or plant cuttings patentable, and they should not have that effect for isolated 
genes.‖170 
Judge Bryson also argued that the isolated genes identified in claim 1 in fact do exist in 
nature, albeit for a short time.  He said, ―During the transcription phase of protein synthesis, the 
BRCA genes are separated from chromosomal proteins.  The transcription process then proceeds 
from a starting point called the promoter to a stopping point often called the terminator.‖171  
More importantly, Judge Bryson saw the forest – each of these isolated DNA segments 
―codes for the same protein as the naturally occurring BRCA1 gene.‖172 Judge Bryson focused 
more on the functioning of the isolated genes, saying ―each gene must function in the same 
manner in the laboratory as it does in the human body.  Indeed, that identity of function in the 
isolated gene is the key to its value.‖173 
Judge Bryson also gave the example of lithium, which does not appear naturally because 
                                                          
169
Id. at 1375. 
170
Id.  In response to this leaf example, Judge Moore said, "With respect, no one could contemplate that snapping a 
leaf from a tree would be worthy of a patent, whereas isolating genes to provide useful diagnostic tools and 
medicines is surely what the patent laws are intended to encourage and protect. Snapping a leaf from a tree is a 
physical separation, not one creating a new chemical entity."  Id. at 1354.  This response is difficult to understand, 
since Judge Moore also said the longer isolated DNA samples did not present any significant additional utility (see 
note 163 above).  Moreover, Judge Moore cited no evidence about what happened when someone snaps a leaf from 
a tree, but presumably there were some living, chemical connections between the leaf and the tree before the leaf 
was snapped, and presumably those connections changed with the snapping.  Since Judge Moore considered 
precisely the changes in covalent bonds when a DNA segment is isolated ("a covalent bond is the defining boundary 
between one molecule and another," Id. at 1352), it seems inconsistent to reject the possibility - without considering 
the facts/evidence - of similar changes in bonds between molecules when a leaf is snapped from a tree.   
171
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1376-77.  For instance, during transcription, the DNA segments are separated from the 
proteins in the chromosomes and from other genes in the DNA.  See discussion of transcription in Appendix at text 
accompanying notes 314-320 below. 
172
Id. at 1376. 
173
Id. at 1378. 
 




it reacts with air and water to form chemical compounds ionically bound to other elements.174  
He continued that when lithium was isolated as an element, it had many industrial applications.  
He said that ―the majority acknowledges that elemental lithium (like other elements) would not 
be patentable subject matter because it ‗is the same element whether it is in the earth or 
isolated.‘‖175  In other words, Judge Bryson was arguing that elemental lithium would not be 
patentable if it were removed from its natural form and the chemical bonds changed, so isolated 
DNA is not patentable when the analogous process from the nucleotides are removed from its 






Judge Lourie: isolated DNA markedly different 
Judge Moore: isolated DNA not markedly different 
Judge Bryson: isolated DNA not markedly different 
 
To determine whether or not material is an unpatentable "product of nature" or a ―man-
made" composition, a court must consider not simply the chemical composition of that matter 
but also its characteristics and natural functioning.  In Chakrabarty, after all, the Court upheld 
                                                          
174
Id. at 1376. 
175
Id. 
176Judge Lourie responded to Judge Bryson's lithium example as follows: "The dissent indicates that we 
'acknowledge[ ] that elemental lithium (like other elements) would not be patentable subject matter because it ‗is the 
same element whether it is in earth or isolated.‘  Again, these facts are not before us, so we do not attempt to 
evaluate the patentability of one form of lithium over another.  Suffice it to say, however, that if lithium is found in 
the earth as other than elemental lithium, such as 'in molecular form' 'because it reacts with air and water,' it is not 
the same material as elemental lithium." AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1354.  Yet Judge Moore also said in the paragraph 
immediately preceding his response to the Dissent, "Elemental lithium is the same element whether it is in the earth 
or isolated...".  Id.  This certainly suggests that Judge Lourie would consider lithium separated from its natural state 
on earth as not patentable.  However, Judge Lourie avoids answering Judge Bryson's argument that elemental 
lithium isolated from nature would not be patentable, so by analogy DNA segments isolated from nature should also 
not constitute patentable subject matter.  Although whether the element lithium would be patentable subject matter 
was not at issue in AMP2, consideration of the consequences of a decision on a case in other areas is reasonable, at 
least in part to confirm whether or not the decision in the case at hand makes sense (the decision in General Electric, 
discussed infra at notes 108-111 above, would support the conclusion that isolated element lithium would not be 
patentable subject matter). 
 




the patent and explained, "the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different 
characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility.‖177  
Judge Lourie acknowledged this consideration of function in Chakrabarty when he said, ―The 
bacteria, as a result [of the man-made genetic engineering] could break down multiple 
components of crude oil, a trait possessed by no single naturally occurring bacterium and of 
significant use in more efficiently treating oil spills.‖178   
In Funk Bros. the Supreme Court also considered function of the aggregation of bacteria, 
explaining that there had been ―no enlargement of the range of their [the bacteria‘s] utility‖ and 
that the ―bacteria perform in their natural way.‖179  In AMP2 Judge Moore said, ―Even though an 
invention did not previously exist in nature in exactly the claimed state, however, does not 
automatically mean it is patentable subject matter,‖ citing Funk Bros.180  In other words, Judge 
Moore agreed that the fact native DNA did not exist in nature in exactly the same form as 
isolated DNA did not mean isolated DNA was patentable -- the Supreme Court considers the 
functioning of the bacteria.181 
Under Chakrabarty and Funk Bros., it was error for Judge Lourie to reject consideration 
of the function and uses of the isolated DNA segments in determining whether or not the product 
                                                          
177447 U.S. at 310 (emphasis added).  Not surprisingly, "characteristic" has more than one dictionary definition.  
Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (2002) includes the following 
two definitions:  "a trait, quality, or property or a group of them distinguishing an individual, group or type"; and 
"any of the variables pertaining to the normal performance of a device (as the grid voltage, plate current, or tube 
resistance of a vacuum tube or the voltage and watt rating of a lamp)."  It is not important to determine whether in 
Chakrabarty the Court was referring to only static characteristics or performance characteristics, because clearly the 
Court referred to "utility" and considered the functioning of the native bacteria and the human-altered bacteria. 
178
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1350 (citing Chakrabarty at 47 U.S. at 305, n.2.); See also AMP1, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 223. 
179333 U.S. at 131. 
180
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1359. 
181Judge Moore concluded, "Even though an invention did not previously exist in nature inexactly the claimed state, 
however, does not automatically mean it is patentable subject matter."  Id.  To support this conclusion, Judge Moore 
quoted Funk Bros., saying, ―Each species has the same effect it always had.  The bacteria perform in their natural 
way.‖  Id. 
 




claims constituted patentable subject matter.  He removed consideration of function and use from 
consideration of patentable subject matter under §101 and relegated consideration of the function 
and use of the DNA segments to §103 (obviousness) and §112 (description and enablement).  If 
a court does not consider the function of a product in determining patentable subject matter, the 
court cannot determine if the invention is an unpatentable physical phenomenon or law of nature 
and eviscerates §101.182   
On the other hand, Judge Bryson appropriately concluded that the isolated DNA 
segments of claim 1 were not markedly different from the native DNA,183 and Judge Moore 
appropriately concluded that there was no evidence the isolated DNA segments of claim 1 had 
different uses from the native DNA.184  This would logically lead to the conclusion by both 
Judges Bryson and Moore that at least claim 1 did not constitute patentable subject matter.185  
                                                          
182
Cf. Conley & Mackowski, supra note 49, at 303 ("some courts and authorities have taken the position that 
patentable subject matter status is not an independent requirement, but merely a label to be applied when a claimed 
invention is found to be new and useful . . . .We shall argue, however, that this view has been squarely repudiated by 
the Supreme Court, most importantly in Diamond v. Chakrabarty."). 
183"The structural differences between the claimed ―isolated‖ genes and the corresponding portion of the native 
genes are irrelevant to the claim limitations, to the functioning of the genes, and to their utility in their isolated form. 
The use to which the genetic material can be put, i.e., determining its sequence in a clinical setting, is not a new use; 
it is only a consequence of possession. In order to sequence an isolated gene, each gene must function in the same 
manner in the laboratory as it does in the human body. Indeed, that identity of function in the isolated gene is the 
key to its value. Moreover, as Judge Moore‘s concurring opinion explains, Myriad has failed to credibly identify 
new uses for the isolated BRCA genes as probes or primers. The naturally occurring genetic material thus has not 
been altered in a way that would matter under the standard set forth in Chakrabarty."  AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1378. 
184As mentioned infra at Part III.B.3, Judge Moore said "the full length gene is too large to be used as a probe .... 
Likewise, an entire isolated gene appears unsuitable for use as a primer in genetic screening for mutations in that 
same gene . . . . As such, the chemical and structural differences in an isolated DNA sequence which includes most 
or all of a gene do not clearly lead to significant new utility as compared to nature. " Id. at *31.  See also John M. 
Conley, Gene Patents And The Product of Nature Doctrine, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 109, 120 (2009) ("the breast 
cancer or tumor suppressor gene patents claim DNA sequences that are defined by the fact that they do exactly the 
same coding work as the versions that occur in the body."). 
185In AMP1 and AMP2, there did not appear to be any dispute of facts among the decisions, except on cDNA, and 
this article does not address claim 5, involving cDNA.  The Federal Circuit reversed the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment on the product claims, but did not expressly direct the District Court on remand either (1) to 
grant summary judgment for Myriad on the product claims or (2) to set the case for trial on the product claims.  See 
generally Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment At Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (1998); Martin H. Redish, Summary 
Judgment And The Vanishing Trial: Implications Of The Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329 (2005).  
However, there are no facts in the decisions of either AMP1 or AMP2 to support a conclusion that the long DNA 
 




However, Judge Moore concurred in the judgment of Judge Lourie on claim 1, due in large part 
to prior actions of the USPTO, discussed in part C below. 
 
Physical phenomena and possible alternative formulations 
 
Judges Lourie and Moore only gave lip service to the Supreme Court's pronouncements 
that physical phenomena are unpatentable - recognizing that pronouncement but not analyzing it.  
They did not address whether claim 1, sequences of nucleotide bases "coding for" the BRCA1 
polypeptide claimed an unpatentable "physical phenomena," unpatentable subject matter under 
Chakrabrty and Funk Bros., just as magnetism186 and electricity187 are unpatentable physical 
phenomena.  If they had addressed that issue and concluded such characteristic was a "physical 
phenomenon" or "natural phenomenon," wouldn't they have had to conclude that under 
Chakrabarty and Funk Bros. claim 1 did not constitute patentable subject matter, since claim 1 
only includes sequences that code for the polypeptide?  But they did not address the issue, and 
Judge Lourie even rejected consideration of the phenomena of coding for purposes of §101,188 
leaving "physical phenomenon" an empty phrase devoid of meaning in the trilogy of 
unpatentable subject matter. 
Would claim 1 have constituted patentable subject matter if Myriad had revised claim 1 
to list the many different base sequences that code for the BRCA1 polypeptide rather than 
defining the subject matter as base sequences that code for the BRCA1 polypeptide?  The 
argument would be that Myriad was no longer claiming a physical phenomenon, because 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
segments of claim 1 have additional uses beyond the uses of the native DNA.  See infra Part III.B.3.  In the Petition, 
the plaintiffs did dispute what the Majority Opinion relied on as facts.  See also Petition at 4 (wherein, plaintiffs did 
dispute what the Majority Opinion relied on as facts). 
186
See Morse , 56 U.S. at 86; American Bell Tel., 8 S. Ct. at 782; see also text accompanying notes 55-64 above. 
187
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130. 
188
See AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1353. 
 




"coding for" was no longer in the claim.  Regardless of whether the claim was for a physical 
phenomenon, the analysis in that situation would still have had to consider – under Chakrabarty 
and Funk – whether the characteristics and uses of the claimed invention would have been 
markedly different than the native sequences.  At least for the long DNA sequences of claim 1 
that both Judges Moore and Bryson could not be used for probes or primers, this article would 
argue that the characteristics and uses would still not be markedly different, so the revised claim 
would still constitute unpatentable subject matter. 
Assuming, as Judge Moore concluded, that shorter isolated DNA segments were 
markedly different because they could act as probes and primers and the native segments could 
not, the analysis should separately consider whether claiming the listed sequences pre-empted 
the physical phenomena and thus remained unpatentable subject matter.  For instance, in their 
concurring opinion in Bilski, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayer said, ―'laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas' . . . 'are the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work,' . . .  and, therefore, if patented, would stifle the very progress that Congress 
is authorized to promote, see, e.g., O’Reilly (explaining that Morse‘s patent on electromagnetism 
for writing would preempt a wide swath of technological developments)."189  Professor Kane has 
argued, "The genetic code does not effectively reside in the public domain if private rights are 
held in DNA gene sequences, so that biologically meaningful exercises of the genetic code 
cannot occur without permission from a patent holder. The patenting of genes, therefore, results 
in constructive preemption of the genetic code, an outcome that conflicts with the Supreme 
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See generally Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3253 (quoting in part Diamond, 450 U.S. at 185, Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67, 
and Morse, 56 U.S. at 113). 
 




Court‘s dictate that the laws of nature should remain in the public domain, free for all to use."190 
A third formulation of claim 1 in the '282 patent would produce a still different analysis – 
if, for instance, Myriad claimed a product patent on an isolated DNA segment made by a specific 
process identified in the claim itself.  Under the most recent Federal Circuit authority, Atlantic 
Thermoplastics Co., Inc. v. Faytex Corp., that claim would only prevent other parties from using 
or selling the claimed isolated DNA segments made by the exact process identified in the 
claim.191  On the other hand, in an earlier decision the Federal Circuit concluded that in 
determining infringement, the court should disregard the process limitations.192  Assuming the 
court reviewing the case followed Atlantic Thermoplastics Co., 193 interpreted and upheld the 
validity of the process limitations to narrow the scope of the claims, then the arguments about 
invalidity would be far different.194  It is recognized that an inventor can make use of laws of 
nature, algorithms and other unpatentable subject matter when used in sufficiently concrete 
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Splitting, supra note 33, at 765 (drawing a distinction between the patentability of "tangible DNA molecules" and 
"exclusionary rights in the sequence information itself, if stored in a computer-readable medium.").  See also  
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY 
L.J. 783, 788, 790-91 (2000) [hereinafter Sequences].  However, making the information theoretically available 
would not address Professor Kane's point that the use of that information could as a practical matter be preempted.  
Also, the deference Professor Eisenberg would give to the USPTO has the same problems this article argues Judge's 
Moore's opinion has, and Sequences was written before the United States changed its position to conclude that 
isolated DNA segments did not constitute patentable subject matter.  Of what value is the sequence information if it 
cannot be used in any practical application? 
191Atlantic Thermoplastics Co., Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 841-42, 846-47 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("a patent 
applicant could not obtain exclusive rights to a product in the prior art by adding a process limitation to the product 
claim. A new process, although eligible for a process patent, could not capture exclusive rights to a product already 
in the prior art....the infringement inquiry for product claims with process limitations focuses on whether the accused 
product was made by the claimed process or its equivalent."). 
192Scripps Clinic & Res. Found v. Genetech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583-84 (Fed.Cir. 1991). 
193For a discussion of this conflict and between Atlantic Thermoplastics and Scripps Clinic and the resultant 
confusion, see Patent Law at 92-94.  See also  Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 335 
F.Supp.2d 558, n. 21 (2004) (showing a district court opinion applying the earlier decision, Scripps Clinic, instead of 
Altantic Thermoplastics).   
194For one discussion of the scope of product claims compared to product by process claims, see Nelson, supra note 
139, at 851 ("purified versions of naturally-occurring proteins. ... These patents typically claim purified versions of 
products that exist in nature. In these cases, it can be argued that it is stretching the concept of inventing greatly to 
say that the patentee really invented the products. The true invention seems to be a way of producing those products 
in a desirable form. But because a product claim is typically broader than one simply on a particular way of making 
that product, patentees seek-and often obtain-product patents."). 
 





These alternative formulations of claim 1, however, are not at issue in AMP2.  Claim 1 of 
the '282 patent claims "isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide," directly claiming a 
physical phenomenon that Judges Moore and Bryson agree have no additional utility beyond the 
utility of the native DNA.  This constitutes unpatentable subject matter under Funk Bros. and 
Chakrabarty.196 
 
C. Judge Moore's Explanations of her Concurrence with Judge Lourie 
 
Judge Moore essentially gave three reasons for not concluding "that an isolated DNA 
sequence that includes most or all of a gene is not patentable subject matter."197  She said the 
following considerations "tipped the scale in favor of patentability": (1) "Congress has, for 
centuries, authorized an expansive scope of patentable subject matter;" (2) "the United States 
Patent Office has allowed patents on isolated DNA sequences for decades, and, more generally, 
has allowed patents on purified natural products for centuries;" and (3) "we must be particularly 
wary of expanding the judicial exception to patentable subject matter where both settled 
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See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 187 ("Our conclusion regarding respondents' claims is not altered by the fact 
that in several steps of the process a mathematical equation and a programmed digital computer are used . . .  the 
respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of 
curing synthetic rubber. Their process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, but they do not 
seek to pre-empt the use of that equation. .... when a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies 
that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent 
laws were designed to protect (e. g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim 
satisfies the requirements of § 101."). 
196This conclusion is also consistent with the general argument of Demaine and Fellmeth, "[t]he history of Supreme 
Court and lower court jurisprudence is consistent with the idea that, in order for a substance based upon a naturally 
occurring phenomenon to constitute an invention, that substance must be substantially transformed from the state in 
which it naturally occurs. Far from being satisfied with mere ―isolation and purification‖ or other pro forma 
alteration, the patent law long demanded that the function or fundamental character of the natural phenomenon be 
changed. In biotechnology, this generally means that the biological function of the chemical or tissue at issue must 
be different from its function in nature.‖. Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double 
Helix: a Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 461 (2002). 
197
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1366.  Judge Moore did not state expressly she would otherwise have ruled claim 1 was not 
patentable subject matter, but suggested such result when she began the quoted sentence with the following phrase:  
"If I were deciding this case on a blank canvas, I might conclude that an isolated DNA sequence . . . ."  Id. 
 




expectations and extensive property rights are involved."198 
 
1. Expansive scope of statutory patentable subject matter vs. Supreme 
Court limits on that scope 
 
In commenting that Congress had for over a hundred years ―authorized an expansive 
scope of patentable subject matter,‖199 Judge Moore overlooked at least half the equation, the 
duty of the courts to interpret statutes and the Constitution.  As the Supreme Court has said, 
"[O]nce Congress has spoken it is 'the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is.'"200  Throughout the hundred plus year period Judge Moore referred to, the courts 
have stated and enforced three exceptions to patentable subject matter under §101 and its 
predecessors: abstract ideas, laws of nature and physical/natural phenomena.201  The expansive 
general nature of the Supreme Court's interpretation of §101 does not give a lower federal court 
authority to disregard the three exceptions to patentable subject matter established by the 
Supreme Court or that Court's interpretation of the determination of what constitutes patentable 
subject matter. 
This trilogy of exceptions is consistent with the principle that "Congress may not 
authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are ... to restrict free access to materials already 
available."202  The exceptions are also consistent with the principle that "absent a discernible 
signal from Congress, we proceed cautiously when dealing with patents that press on the limits 
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Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315 (quoting in part Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)). 
201See Part II.A and B above.  In Bilski, the Supreme Court referred to "these well-established exceptions" to the 
expansive scope of §101 and said, "Any suggestion in this Court's case law that the Patent Act's terms deviate from 
their ordinary meaning has only been an explanation for the exceptions for laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas."  130 S. Ct. at 3226.  See also discussion of Chakrabarty at text accompanying notes 89-105 above.  
In other words, this trilogy is a restraint on, an exception to, the expansive nature of § 101, and § 101 does not limit 
the application of this trilogy. 
202
Deere, 383 U.S. at 6.  
 




of the ‗standard written into the constitution.‘‖203  Certainly patents on isolated DNA segments 
reside "closer to this boundary between statutory and non-statutory subject matters."204  As the 
Supreme Court expressed it in Bilski, "these exceptions have defined the reach of the statute as a 
matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years."205 
Judge Moore did not apply the applicable law to the facts she found.  She said that an 
isolated full-length gene was too large to be used as a probe or primer, and she did not identify 
any use for an isolated gene compared to the native gene.206  In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court 
found patentable subject matter because the "[p]atentee has produced a new bacterium with 
markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for 
significant utility."207  The genetically engineered bacteria would help clean up oil spills where 
the "native" bacteria did not.208  In Funk Bros., the Supreme Court rejected the patent because 
"the combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in the six species of bacteria, 
and no enlargement of the range of their utility."209   
It was error for Judge Moore to disregard the guidance from the Supreme Court's 
holdings in Chakrabarty and Funk Bros. and instead rely on the generally expansive nature of 
§101 recognized in Chakrabarty. 
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Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3253 (quoting in part Deere); ,Graham, 383 U.S. at 6.  Judge Moore concluded it was 
significant that "Congress explicitly declined to implement legislation to 'affect any of those current existing 
patents.". AMP2,653 F.3d at 1372.  But failure of Congress to act is not a "discernable signal," particularly when 
many of the patents issued could be valid, given the diversity of facts behind biotech patents.  For instance, all three 
judges in AMP2 concluded the claim regarding cDNA was valid.  For instance, even   Judge Bryson said, "I agree 
with the court that the claims to BRCA cDNA are eligible for patenting."  Id. at 1378. 
204MOY, supra note 14, at 5-9 ("Inevitably, some fields of applied technology reside closer to this boundary between 
statutory and non-statutory subject matters than do others....  Two of these with especially large commercial 
significance are computer software and biotechnology."). 
205130 S. Ct. at 3225 (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 174 (1853)). See also, Eric J. Rogers, Can You Patent 
Genes? Yes And No, 93 J.PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 19, 31 (2011). 
206
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1366-67.   
207447 U.S. at 310. 
208 Id. at 305. 
209333 U.S. at 131. 
 







The second example Judge Moore gave was that the ―US Patent and Trademark Office 
had allowed patents on isolated DNA segments for decades.‖210  In his dissent, Judge Bryson 
rejected this argument, pointing out that the PTO ―lacks substantive rulemaking authority‖ on the 
issue of patentability.211  He added, ―The comments that the PTO issued at the time of its 2001 
guidelines in response to suggestions that isolated human genes were not patentable are, frankly, 
perfunctory . . . [and] I do not regard them as worthy of much weight in the analysis of this 
complex question.‖212   
The poor performance of the USPTO supports the position of Judge Bryson not to defer 
to the practices of the USPTO in this area, even without the decisions in Chakrabarty and Funk 
Bros.  For instance, funding pressures appear to create a USPTO bias to grant patents.213  In the 
Federal Circuit's decision in Bilski, Judge Mayer in dissent said, "Patents granted in the wake of 
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AMP2,653 F.3d at 1367.  Interestingly, in a decision a month after AMP2, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. 
Biogen IDEC, 2011 WL 3835409, (Fed. Cir. August 31, 2011), Judge Moore dissented (*18-26) from the two other 
judges on the panel that found two patents for a "method of immunizing a mammalian subject" were "eligible under 
§101 to be considered for patenting."  Id. at *1-2.  The USPTO had approved the patents, but Judge Moore gave no 
apparent deference to these patent grants and did not even mention the USPTO in her dissent. 
211
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1380 (citing Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed.Cir. 1991)). 
212
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1380 (citing Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).  The Supreme 
Court expressed the same principle in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001)("The fair measure of 
deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts 
have looked to the degree of the agency‘s care . . . its consistency . . . formality . . . and relative expertness, (footnote 
omitted) and to the persuasiveness of the agency‘s position."). 
213Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO's Asymmetric Incentives:  Pressure To Expand Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO 
ST. L. J. 379, 385-86 (2011) ("The PTO is funded entirely through user fees; the PTO‘s budget is set to the amount 
of its projected revenue . . . . The fees the PTO collects for examining patent applications covers less than one-third 
of the cost to the Agency for performing this service. In contrast, the post-allowance fees-fees the Agency only 
collects when it grants a patent-are pure profit, as it costs the Agency next to nothing to perform these services. 
Thus, the PTO‘s  strong funding incentives to grant patents also results in a systematic driving force, shaping the 
Agency‘s views on substantive law in the patent protective direction."). 
 




State Street have ranged from the somewhat ridiculous to the truly absurd."214  Quoting Professor 
Thomas, Professor Dratler reported, "Among the more reviled Patent Office grants has been its 
1968 patent on a method of swallowing a pill."215  Professors Conley and Makowski reported on 
the uproar that occurred when the USPTO granted a patent on a cell line from a specific 
individual from Papua New Guinea, until NIH renounced its patent.216  Professors Burk and 
Lemley have said, "The PTO today is overwhelmed.   Patent pendency is much longer than it has 
ever been, and the problem is getting worse, not better.  The PTO is not even keeping pace with 
new applications."217   
There is no historical basis for deference to the USPTO on questions of law.  Judge 
Bryson highlighted that ―prior to the Supreme Court‘s decision in Chakrabarty, the PTO had 
determined that microorganisms were not subject to patenting, but the Supreme Court gave no 
indication that it regarded that view as entitled to deference.‖218  He also pointed out that in 
Chakrabarty, "the Court gave short shrift to the Commissioner‘s contention (which was made 
the lead argument in its brief) that the patentability of life-forms was an issue that should be left 
to Congress."219  Similarly showing no deference to the thousands of business method patents the 
USPTO had granted,220 the majority (including Judges Lourie and Moore) of the Federal Circuit 
in Bilski said, "Neither the PTO nor the courts may pay short shrift to the machine-or-
transformation test by using purported equivalents or shortcuts such as a 'technological acts' 
                                                          
214545 F.3d at 1004 (citing a patented "method of training janitors to dust and vacuum using video displays"; 
"method for selling expert advice"; and "method for enticing customers to order additional good at a fast food 
restaurant").  
215Dratler, Jr., supra note 64, at 304. 
216
Rethinking1, supra note 49, at 301-02. 
217Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts  or Sign Posts?  Rethinking Patent Claim Construction?, 157 U.PA. 
L. REV. 1743, 1786 (2009). 
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See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 992 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (statistics cited by Judge Newman in dissent). 
 




requirement."221  Then the Supreme Court in Bilski in turn showed no deference to the USPTO or 
the Federal Circuit.222 
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has expressly ruled that the issue of patentable subject matter 
is a question of law and that it decides those questions de novo without deference.223  This is not 
an isolated ruling: "the Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that it grants no deference 
whatsoever to PTO legal interpretations."224  Particularly since the three exclusions from 
patentable subject matter are the creation of the courts, not statutes, and there is no reason to 
assume the USPTO has more expertise than the courts on this crucial issue of law at the 
intersection of patent law and life. 
Indeed, the United States essentially concluded that the defendant USPTO practice has 
been wrong with respect to claim 1.  On October 29, 2010, the United States Government filed a 
"Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party" (the "US Brief").225  
The US Brief said, "the United States has concluded that isolated but otherwise unaltered 
genomic DNA is not patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101."226  The US Brief 
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Id. at 964. 
222In fact, the only reference to "Trademark Office" in the Supreme Court's decision in Bilski appears to be the 
following footnote 5 in Justice Stevens concurring opinion:  "Although a few patents issued before 1952 that related 
to methods of doing business, see United States Patent and Trademark Office, Automated Financial or Management 
Data Processing Methods, http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/index.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).  
These patents were rare, often issued through self-registration rather than any formalized patent examination, 
generally were not upheld by courts, and arguably are distinguishable from pure patents on business methods 
insofar as they often involved the manufacture of new objects. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 974, and n. 18 
(C.A.Fed.2008) (case below) (Dyk, J., concurring); Pollack 74–75; Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress 243.  
130 S. Ct. at 3246. 
223
In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2009)("It is well-established that 'whether the asserted claims . . . 
are invalid for failure to claim statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, is a question of law which we review 
without deference,'" quoting in part AT & T Corp. v. Excel Commc‘ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed.Cir.1999)).   
224Stuart Minor Benjamin  Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA?  What the Patent System Can Learn From 
Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L. J. 269, 299-300 and nn. 159-162 (2007) (citing, among other cases, Arnold 
Partnership v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004)(" This court reviews statutory interpretation, the central 
issue in this case, without deference"). 
225
See 2010 WL 4853320 (2011) [hereinafter US Brief]. 
226
Id. at *18. 
 




acknowledged that this position was different than past practice of the USPTO, but explained 
that the District Court's decision in AMP1 had "prompted the United States to reevaluate the 
relationship between such patents and the settled principle under Supreme Court precedent that 
the patent laws do not extend to products of nature."227  The United States concluded that the 
"Court should . . . affirm the district court‘s conclusion that the claims encompassing isolated 
human genomic DNA are invalid."228 
In short, the history of the USPTO and existing judicial decisions do not support giving 
deference to the fact that the USPTO has granted many patents to various forms of isolated DNA 
segments.  Moreover, the position of the United States government does not support affirming 
the position of the USPTO on claim 1.  The other litigation, "settled expectations," and "property 
rights" mentioned by Judge Moore and discussed next provide no more support for his 
Concurring Opinion. 
 




Judge Moore also suggested that ―claims similar to the ones at issue in this case have 
been the focal point of important litigation,‖ citing Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.229 
and Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Russel, Inc.230 However, as mentioned above, patentable 
subject matter was not decided in Chugai,231 nor was it decided in Hoechst Marion Russel.232 




Id. at *37.  The United States asked that the Federal Circuit "reverse the district court‘s invalidation of the 
composition claims that are limited to cDNAs and similar man-made constructs." 
229
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1367 (citing Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,  927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
230126 F.Supp.2d 69 (D.Mass. 2001). 
231
See supra text accompanying note 116.  Cf., Conley, supra note 184 at 116 ("That Amgen's patent was directed to 
statutory subject matter was taken for granted and not at issue in the case."). 
 




As mentioned above in the discussion of Intervet, in 2010 Judge Dyk observed that 
neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit had "directly decided the issue of the 
patentability of isolated DNA molecules" and then gave reasons supporting the argument that 
such molecules did not constitute patentable subject matter.233  Judges Prost and Bryson said, 
"We do not address the issues of validity and non-patentable subject matter discussed by the 
dissent because these issues were not addressed by the district court or raised on appeal."234  The 
panel instructed the District Court on remand to determine "whether the accused product 
infringes the asserted claims of the '601 patent,"235 without any direction to consider whether the 
claim constituted patentable subject matter.   
In other words, if the parties do not raise the issue of patentable subject matter, the courts 
generally do not consider it.236  In fact, the parties in patent litigation often seem to avoid raising 
claims of unpatentable subject matter and instead challenge patents on other grounds, perhaps 
because each of them wants their own product patents for unpatentable subject matter and do not 
want to rock the boat on this issue.237 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
232The issues in Hoechst Marion Russel were claim construction, definiteness,  inequitable conduct, obviousness, 
enablement, and written description,  not patentable subject matter.  126 F.Supp.2d at 137-66. 
233
See infra p. 19 discussing Intervet. 
234
Intervet Inc., 617 F.3d at n.4. 
235
Id. at 1292. 
236In what became a companion case to Chakrabarty, In re Bergy, the Federal Circuit held that a claim for a 
biologically pure culture of the microorganism Streptomyces vellosus was patentable.236  563 F.2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 
1977), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 438 U.S. 902 (1978) for reconsideration in light of Parker v. Flook; 596 
F. 2d 952 (Fed. Cir. 1979), cert. granted and Bergy dismissed as moot in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 
(1980).  The patent examiner had rejected the patent application on the ground that the claim did not constitute 
patentable subject matter because the microorganism was a ―product of nature.‖  The United States Patent and 
Trademark Board of Appeals affirmed the rejection of the application, but on the ground that § 101 precluded the 
grant of patents for living organisms, a slightly different issue.  Id. at 1033-1034.  When the rejection was appealed  
to the U.S. Court of Custom and Patent Appeals, that court said, ―We consider the product-of-nature issue to have 
been abandoned and no longer in the case.‖  Id. at 1035.  On rare occasions, courts have raised the issue of 
patentable subject matter sua sponte; see Ineligibility, supra note 4, at 532-535. 
237
Ineligibility, supra note 4, at 528-529 ("Many patent disputes are between similarly situated competitors, who 
may be in conflict over a particular patent, but in agreement regarding the general eligibility of subject matter in a 
particular field. The consequences of a determination that patentable subject matter does not exist might extend 
 






Judge Moore referred to the "settled expectations of the biotechnology industry" and then 
said, ―The type of fundamental alteration in the scope of patentable subject matter argued in this 
case ‗risk[s] destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors in their property,‘‖ quoting in 
part Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku  Kogyo Kabushiki Co.238  Yet that quote from Festo is 
misleading, because Festo involved "the doctrine of equivalents and the rule of prosecution 
history estoppel [that] are settled law"239 that had been established through a series of Supreme 
Court holdings,240 not practices by administrative agencies such as the USPTO.  As the Court 
observed in Festo, "patent prosecution occurs in the light of our case law. Inventors who 
amended their claims under the previous regime had no reason to believe they were conceding 
all equivalents. ....There is no justification for applying a new and more robust estoppel to those 
who relied on prior doctrine."241  Festo simply is an example of the Supreme Court following the 
principle of stare decisis and not rejecting its prior holdings. 
Consistency in judicial rulings - stare decisis - is an important principle of jurisprudence 
in this country, but avoiding decisions based on public opinion is also important.  In Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,242 the Supreme Court said that "the very 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
beyond the particular patent in suit, resulting in hesitation on the part of either party (or the courts) to raise the issue 
for fear of sector-wide consequences.").  See also Splitting, supra note 33,.at 726 ("[A]ssertions of lack of patentable 
subject matter as a ground for invalidity are seldom raised during patent litigation . . . . Although the most likely 
reason for this absence is that the issue is not germane to most inter parties disputes, patent litigation also often 
involves similarly situated competitors, neither of which may be interested in raising an issue with implications 
beyond the patent in suit. When litigation results in a determination of a lack of patentable subject matter, nonparties 
may be affected if patents to an entire class of inventions are called into question."). 
238
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1368 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 
(2002)). 
239
Festo, 535 U.S. at 739. 
240
See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) and Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. 
v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950). 
241
Festo, 535 U.S. at 739. 
242Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). 
 




concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time 
that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable."243  The Court recognized that in very 
limited situations courts could diverge from precedent, 244 but the Court emphasized the 
importance of relying on past holdings and not public passions:  "The Court must take care to 
speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for 
them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures 
having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make."245   
Judge Moore said, ―The settled expectations of the inventing community with respect to 
isolated DNA claims are built upon . . . judicial precedent, such as Parke-Davis and Merck.‖246  
To cite these two purification cases for "settled expectations" and not other historical cases 
concerning "purification" was selective – even if expectations were relevant.  In an earlier part of 
her opinion, for instance, Judge Moore cited In re Marden, in which the court held that 
"[u]ranium is a product of nature, and the appellant is not entitled to a patent on the same, or 
upon any of the inherent natural qualities of that metal."247  She also cited General Electric v. 
DeForest Radio, Co., in which the Third Circuit held that purified tungsten did not constitute 
patentable subject matter, even though purified tungsten was ductile, whereas in nature it was 
brittle. 248  If settled expectations were relevant, Marden and General Electric would have helped 
to create expectations that isolated DNA segments were not patentable subject matter. 
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Id. 
244 Id. at  854-869. 
245
Id. at 865-866. 
246
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1368. See discussion of these two cases at text accompanying notes 112-115 above.  It is 
difficult to reconcile Judge Moore's assertion that Parke-Davis helped create "settled expectations" with the 
Majority Opinion, in which Judge Lourie distinguished Parke-Davis and said the In Re Marden cases were 
"similarly inapposite."  AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1352.  How can a case that is not relevant according to Judge Lourie help 
create settled expectations? 
247
In re Marden, 47 F.2d 957, 957 (CCPA 1931) (cited in AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1360). 
248Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 643 (3d Cir. 1928) (see discussion of General Electric at text 
accompanying notes 109-111 above). 
 




In fact, scholars have recognized from 1990 onward that whether isolated DNA segments 
constituted patentable subject matter was an open question.  In 1990, Professor Eisenberg 
recognized that "the patents may still be vulnerable to challenges to their validity in the 
courts."249  In 2003, Professors Conley and Makowski wrote that "the product of nature doctrine 
still has a meaningful role to play in the protection of the biological public domain," and that 
"there is no warrant in the history of the product of nature doctrine for allowing it to be 
circumvented by the mere incantation of some combination of the words 'isolated,' 'purified,' and 
'synthesized.'"250  In 2004, Professor Kane wrote, "The patenting of genes . . . results in 
constructive preemption of the genetic code, an outcome that conflicts with the Supreme Court‘s 
dictate that the laws of nature should remain in the public domain, free for all to use."251 
To suggest that courts should try to determine what expectations in the community are on 
subjects that no court has ruled on seems to turn stare decisis on its head.  Courts should issue 
principled decisions removed from public passions.  Judge Bryson said, "Although my 
colleagues believe our analysis of the legal question in this case should be influenced by 
purported expectations of the inventing community based on the PTO‘s past practice of issuing 
patents on human genes, that is in effect to give the PTO lawmaking authority that Congress has 




Judge Moore referred to "extensive property rights,"253 but patents are necessarily subject 
                                                          
249Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L. J. 721, 721-22 and n. 4 (1990). 
250
Rethinking 2, supra note 102 at 398. 
251
Splitting, supra note 33, at 765. 
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AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1381. 
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Id. at 1367. 
 




to challenge and - where appropriate - invalidation.254  If the Federal Circuit had affirmed the 
District Court's AMP2, that would not have meant the patents of other holders of product patents 
for isolated DNA would necessarily have been invalidated.  There would have to have been 
litigation challenging the other patents, and litigants who had unsuccessfully challenged the 
patents in the past would be barred by res judicata from re-litigating the issue of patentable 
subject matter.255  There probably would have been many patents on isolated DNA that would 
not have been challenged at all.  Indeed, other patented isolated segments of DNA might have 
significantly different characteristics and additional utility over the native DNA and therefore 
constitute patentable subject matter under Chakrabarty and Funk Bros. Affirmance of the 
District Court's opinion would not have eliminated any property rights. 
It is appropriate for a court to consider the effect on property rights established by prior 
judicial decisions when the court is considering whether to change an established judicial policy, 
but the Federal Circuit did not face such a situation in AMP2.  In contrast, in Bilski the Supreme 
Court said, "'[W]e must proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights'  into an 
area that the Patent Act likely was not 'enacted to protect‘ . . . lest we create a legal regime that 
Congress never would have endorsed, and that can be repaired only by disturbing settled 
property rights."256  The reference to "settled property rights" in Bilski was referring to property 
                                                          
25435 U.S.C. § 282 provides, "A patent shall be presumed valid" and "The burden of establishing invalidity of a 
patent ... shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity."  In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 
2238, 2242 (2011), the Supreme Court held that "§ 282 requires an invalidity defense [to a claim of infringement] to 
be proved by clear and convincing evidence."  In contrast, in trademark law, continuous use of a trademark for 5 
years subsequent to registration of the mark can make that mark incontestable for most purposes.  See 15 U.S.C. § 
1065.  If Congress had wanted patent grants to be incontestable and not subject to challenge, they could have said 
so. 
255For a discussion of res judicata in patent litigation, see Edmund J. Haughey, Consider The Possibility Of Future 
Claim Preclusion Before Filing A Complaint For Patent Infringement, 21 No. 4 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1 
(2009). 
256
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3250 (citing Parker, 437 U.S. at 596). See also Nese, supra note 5, at 168 ("The recently 
decided Bilski decision marks a notable change in the court's interpretation of patent-eligible subject matter as 
 




rights established by the courts, not presumptions of validity created by the USPTO and 
expressly subject to challenge by statute.257 
There is no basis for giving patent holders the benefit of their gamble258 in applying for 
and obtaining patents on DNA segments when there have been no court decisions holding that 




Of what value are facts, case law and stare decisis if a court can disregard them?  The 
opinion of Judge Moore gives deference to many things in the past, but not the facts or the law.  
On the law, in Chakrabarty the Supreme Court showed that in determining patentable subject 
matter, a court should consider if the invention has markedly different characteristics and if there 
are potentially significant additional uses beyond what exists in nature.259  On the facts, Judge 
Moore essentially agreed that the isolated segments of claim 1 did not have different uses than 
the native segments.260  This combination of law and facts should have resulted in his joining 
with Judge Bryson to affirm the District Court's ruling on claim 1. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
applied to process patens and may even partially limit the broad eligibility interpretations rooted in Chakrabarty.").  
The Federal Circuit's decision in Bilski was stricter than the Supreme Court's decision in Bilski, since the Federal 
Circuit's decision limited process patents to the "machine or transformation" test.  545 F.3d at 966.  In contrast, the 
Supreme Court in Bilski ruled that "the machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue, an 
investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101. The machine-or-
transformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible 'process.'" 130 S. Ct. at 
3227. 
257In Parker, the Court said  "[i]t is our duty to construe the patent statutes as they now read, in light of our prior 
precedents, and we must proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen 
by Congress." 437 U.S. at 596.  The Court in Parker also quoted Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 
518, 531 (1972) (―We would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before approving the position of a 
litigant who, as respondent here, argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of public use narrower, 
than courts had previously thought. No such signal legitimizes respondent's position in this litigation.‖).   
258
See, e.g.,Nese, supra note 5, at 152-53 ("the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) was flooded with 
applications relating to genes and genetic testing methods . . . . During this rush, lots of ―land-grabbing‖ occurred 
without actually knowing what was being claimed."). 
259
See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-10. 
260
AMP2, 2011 WL 3211513 at 122-24. 
 




Deference instead to the past actions of the USPTO on this question of law is without 
judicial support, particularly in light of the holdings in Chakrabarty and Funk Bros and the three 
exceptions to patentable subject matter that "have defined the reach of the statute [§101] as a 
matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years,"261  Trying to speculate on the 
expectations of certain citizens and not others has lowered the Federal Circuit in AMP2 to a poll 
taker, not a judicial body bound by Chakrabarty and Funk Bros.262   
 
D. In Addition to Stare Decisis, Patent Policies Support Funk and 
Chakrabarty 
 
 The Supreme Court can of course not follow precedent if it so chooses.  However, the 
basic balancing considerations of patent law support Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty and do not 
provide a reason for the Supreme Court to disregard precedent.   
 The fundamental balancing task for patent law involves economic regulation and 
incentives at one end to increase innovation and benefits to society while maintaining personal 
freedom at the other end.263  Thomas Jefferson talked of the difficulty of drawing the right 
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Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.  See also Rogers, supra note 205, at 31. 
262The Plaintiffs and Appelllees before the Federal Circuit in AMP2 in the litigation are The Association for 
Molecular Pathology, The American College of Medical Genetics, The American Society for Clinical Pathology, 
The College of American Pathologists, Haig Kazazian, MD, Arupa Ganguly, PhD, Wendy Chung, MD, PhD, Harry 
Ostrer, MD, David Ledbetter, PhD, Stephen Warren, PhD, Ellen Matloff, M.S., Elsa Reich, M.S., Breast Cancer 
Action, Boston Women‘s Health Book Collective, Lisbeth Ceriani, Runi Limary, Genae Girard, Patrice Fortune, 
Vicky Thomason, and Kathleen Raker.  See Brief of Appellees in AMP2 at 2010 WL 5311467.  Their Brief said, 
"The patenting of human genes violates long-establsihed Supreme Court precedent that prohibits the patenting of 
laws of nature, natural phenomena, products of nature, and abstract ideas."  2010 WL 5311467 at *37.  Did the 
expectations of this group of scientists and patients not count?  The answer is their expectations, and the 
expectations of others that are not based on judicial holdings, should not count under the rule of law.  Thus, it is 
irrelevant that the Chief Policy Office of BIO Ventures for Global Health wrote before the decision in AMP2 "that 
not only are DNA patents not required for innovation in the development of gene-based molecular diagnostics, but 
also they actually hinder the advancement and clinical adoption of personalized medicine." See Robertson, supra 
note 9, at 399. 
263Professor Dratler said, "[i]t is well understood that antitrust law and patent law are just two sides of the same coin-
-the coin of economic law. The English recognized this point nearly four centuries ago, when the Parliament adopted 
the Statute of Monopolies . . . That statute imposed a general prohibition on monopoly . . . much like our Sherman 
Act . . . but it allowed patents as an exception to the general rule.".  See Dratler, supra note 64, at 302. 
 




balance in 1813:  "[c]onsidering the exclusive right to invention as given not of natural right, but 
for the benefit of society, I know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which 
are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not."264   
 The Supreme Court has explained that the "basic quid pro quo contemplated by the 
Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public 
from an invention with substantial utility."265  However, since neither Judge Moore nor Judge 
Bryson found any additional utility in the isolated segments of claim 1,266 and since Judge Lourie 
thought utility was irrelevant to patentable subject matter,267 the policy of promoting substantial 
increases in utility could not have justified the Federal Circuit overlooking the requirements of 
Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty to compare the functioning of the "invention" with the functioning 
of the analogous product in nature. 
 The Patent Clause offers "a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to 
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development."268  The 
justification for this right of exclusion is that the resultant "productive effort thereby fostered will 
                                                          
264August 13, 1813 letter of Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, 
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/P/tj3/writings/brf/jefl220.htm (last visited on Aug. 29, 2011). 
265Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).  Judge Moore might argue that the reference to "utility" in Brenner 
refers to "utililty" under § 101 and not patentable subject matter (also under § 101) and that are separate concepts.  
Of course, the single sentence of § 101 does not suggest that "utility" and patentable subject matter are separate 
considerations:  "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title."  Moreover, in Chakrabarty, where the only question was patentable subject matter, the 
Supreme Court highlighted its consideration of utility.  See text accompanying notes 89-99 above.  As Professor 
Feldman recently said, "Patent law has become too segmented in thinking about the elements of patentability, and 
we risk losing the ability to see the system as a dynamic whole, with all of the parts working together. In particular, 
it makes little sense to think about patentable subject matter in isolation from the other elements of patentability and 
limiting principles of patent law. Rather, one should analyze patentable subject matter in the following manner: 
considering the limitations of the patent system as a whole, are we likely to have preemption problems with the 
subject matter of this patent?"  Robin Feldman, Whose Body Is It?  Human Cells and the Strange Effects of Property 
and Intellectual Property Law, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1377, 1391-92 (2011).  Chakrabarty and Funk mandate 
consideration of function/use. 
266
See infra Part III.B.3. 
267
See infra Part III.B.2. 
268Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). 
 




have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of 
manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better 
lives for our citizens. In return for the right of exclusion-this ‗reward for inventions‘ . . . the 
patent laws impose upon the inventor a requirement of disclosure." 269  In other words, the Patent 
Clause ―reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of 
monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the ‗Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.‘‖270  
 In the area of basic scientific research, the most thorough investigation by 
distinguished scientists on the effects of patents in this area shows that patents on basic genetic 
discoveries have not increased basic genetic research and have probably harmed the availability 
of genetic testing.271  In 2010 in a letter to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Chair 
(the "Chair") of the Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society ("SACGHS Report") 
summarized the findings of the committee, saying that "patents on genetic discoveries do not 
appear to be necessary for either basic genetic research or the development of available genetic 
tests."272  The Chair added, "[p]atents have been used to narrow or clear the market of existing 
tests, thereby limiting, rather than promoting availability of testing."273 The Chair concluded, 
"The substantial number of existing patents on genes and methods of diagnosis also pose a threat 
to the development of multiplex testing, parallel sequencing, and whole-genomic sequencing, the 
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Id. 
270Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 498 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). 
271SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, HEALTH AND SOCIETY, GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING 
PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS, (2010) [hereinafter SACGHS Report] 
available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf. The Roster and Ex Officio 
Members of SACGHS are listed at pp. i-iv. 
272Steven Teutsch, Cover letter to SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, HEALTH AND SOCIETY, GENE 








areas of genetic testing with the greatest potential future benefits."274   
 The Chair's letter and the following SACGHS Report findings are consistent with not 
expanding the reach of patent law to weaken the exclusion from patentable subject matter of 
physical phenomena, laws of nature and abstract ideas:  "The underlying rationale for the 
exclusions is that scientific advances depend on an available substrate of basic knowledge, and 
that, therefore, patenting the intellectual foundation of a field has an adverse effect on its 
progress:"275 
 
 "[T]he prospect of patent protection of a genetic research discovery 
does not play a significant role in motivating scientists to conduct 
genetic research.  Scientists typically are driven instead by factors 
such as the desire to advance the understanding, the hope of 
improving patient care though new discoveries, and concerns for 
their own career development."276 
 "Although the patent law requirements of disclosure and 
description of a claimed invention is meant to expand the public 
storehouse of knowledge and stimulate follow-on research, there is 
evidence to suggest that patents on genes discourage follow-on 
research."277 
 "[P]atents are not needed to encourage disclosure in industry 
because a new health care product or service will not be accepted 
by the clinical community unless there is disclosure . . . . "278 
 "[E]xclusive rights do not result in faster test development." 
 "Where patents and licensing practices have created a sole provider 
of a genetic test, patient access to those tests has suffered in a 
number of ways."279 
 
Consistent with the SACGHS Report, the Chief Policy Officer of BIO Ventures for Global 
concluded that "not only are DNA sequence patents not required for innovation in the 
development of gene-based molecular diagnostic, but also they actually hinder the advancement 
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and clinical adoption of personalize medicine."280  In short, the economic goals of patent law do 
not support an increase in the reach of patent law to patents on isolated DNA segments.   
 The final branch of the patent law balance  -- preserving public access to the building 
blocks of knowledge and the benefits of those building blocks – does not support extending the 
patent monopoly to isolated DNA segments.281  As the Supreme Court said in Deere, "Congress 
may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from 
the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available."282  Maintaining this 
public domain is the reason for the trilogy of exceptions to patentable subject matter that the 
Supreme Court has consistently enforced:  "The concepts covered by these exceptions are 'part of 
the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.'"283  
Professors Nard, Barnes and Madison have said, "[o]n the one hand, patent law strives to 
promote technologic innovations through proprietary rights, and, on the other hand, to provide 
legal space or access to those innovations."284  Professor Mueller has said, "[p]atent rights should 
be understood as carefully limited exceptions to the general rule of free and open competition 
through imitation."285  Patents for isolated DNA segments threaten to eviscerate the public 
domain for the building blocks of basic scientific research that are "free to all men and reserved 
                                                          
280Robertson, supra note 9, at 68.  In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court observed,  "The large amount of research that 
has already occurred when no researcher had sure knowledge that patent protection would be available suggests that 
legislative or judicial fiat as to patentability will not deter the scientific mind from probing into the unknown any 
more than Canute could command the tides."  447 U.S. at 317. 
281
See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 265, at 1385 ("Our enthusiasm and appreciation for the miraculous advances of 
science should not blind us to the necessity of thinking through the interests of the people whose cells provide the 
raw materials, nor should it obviate the necessity of ensuring that those raw materials are properly obtained."). 
282
Deere, 383 U.S. at 6. 
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Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (quoting in part Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130).  
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(2d. ed 2010). 
285 JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 8 (3d ed. 2009). 
 




exclusively to none.'"286  
 In other word, the basic policies behind patent law do not warrant a rejection or 





"Our role is to interpret the law that Congress has written in accordance with the 
governing precedents.  I would do so and would affirm the district court's rulings . 
. . ." — Judge Bryson in dissent in AMP2.287 
 
Claim 1 of Myriad's '282 patent claims: "An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 
polypeptide, said polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2."288  
Myriad does not list all the isolated sequences it claims to have a right to monopolize, but instead 
claims a patent on the physical phenomena itself – all DNA segments that code for the BRCA1 
polypeptide,289 even the sequences Myriad has not identified and even if the person created the 
sequences through a method or methods not contemplated by Myriad.290 
The Supreme Court has stated that "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents 
whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access 
to materials already available."291  Unfortunately, in AMP2, the Federal Circuit – not Congress – 
has done just that and has given Myriad a wall to restrict free access to materials that have been 
both inside and available to, humans for centuries.292 
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The isolated DNA segments of claim 1 do exactly the same coding as the do the native 
segments – nothing more; nothing less.293  The segments of claim 1 do not act as primers or 
probes,294 so they do not have markedly different characteristics or utility than native DNA,295 
which the Supreme Court in Funk Bros.296 and Chakrabarty297 showed that courts must consider. 
The effect of the sequence of the nucleotide bases is a physical phenomenon that Myriad has not 
created but has captured in its claim.  Judges Lourie and Moore disregarded Chakrabarty and 
Funk Bros. in AMP2.   
The Supreme Court should accept cert. and reverse the decision in AMP2 on claim 1.298  
The Court should reject and tear down this patent wall so such DNA segments are readily 





                                                                                                                                                                                           
for Affirmance at 2011 WL 585712 at *2 ("The patenting of human genes is an affront to humanity. .... Basic 
principles of patent law provide that products of nature and laws of nature are unpatentable subject matter. Whether 
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APPENDIX: BIOCHEMISTRY,299 THE GENETIC CODE AND THE MYRIAD 
PATENTS 
DNA, chromosomes and genes 
 
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is a long molecule believed to be found in every single cell of 
every living organism.300  Every "DNA molecule is made up of repeating units of four nucleotide bases – 
adenine ("A"), thymine ("T"), cytosine ("C"), and guanine ("G") – which are covalently linked, or bonded 
together via a sugarphosphate or phosphodiester backbone."301  DNA typically consists of a double helix 
of two intertwined strands of DNA chemically bound to each other through base pairing.  The adenine on 
one strand of DNA always binds to the thymine on the other strand, and the guanine on one strand always 
binds to the cytosine on the other strand.302  Two bases form as rungs of the double helix backbones, with 
adenine pairing with thymine, and cytosine pairing with guanine.303 
DNA dictates the functioning of each individual cell by directing the making of proteins at certain 
times and amounts.304  Cells are classified as either eukaryotic (including the cells in plants, animals, 
fungi and protists) or prokaryotic (e.g., bacteria).305   In eukaryotic cells, most of the cell's DNA is found 
in the nucleus of the cell, organized into units called chromosomes.306  The chromosomes of human 
beings contain the human genetic code, or genome, consisting of approximately 25,000 genes and 3 
billion base pairs, that dicate the creation of the proteins in that individual.307   
                                                          
299H. ROBERT HORTON, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BIOCHEMISTRY 1, (4th ed. 2006) ("Biochemistry is the study of the 
molecules and chemical reactions of life.  It is the discipline that uses the principles and language of chemistry to 
explain vbiology at the molecular level.  Biochemists have discovered that the same chemical compounds and the 
same central metabolic processes are found in organisms as distantly related as bacteria, plants, and humans.").   
300Conley & Makowski, supra note 49, at 309. 
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AMP1, 702 F. Supp. 2d  at 193-94. 
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AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1335.  See also, Andrew Chin, Artful Prior Art and the Quality of DNA Patents, 57 ALA. L. 
REV. 975, 981-82 (2006)("The two ends of each strand of a DNA molecule are distinguishable in that the sugar at 
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Two strands can join, or ―hybridize,‖ to form a DNA molecule (the familiar ―double helix‖) if, when the 5‘ end of a 
strand is aligned with the 3‘ end of another, there is a correspondence of complementary base pairs between their 
two sequences . . . such sequences are called ―reverse complements.‖).  For a more detailed discussion of the 
structure of DNA see HORTON, supra note 299, at 590-97. 
304
Rethinking 1, supra note 300, at 311; HORTON, supra note 299 at 647-48 (in addition to genes that encode 
proteins, "all cells contain genes that are expressed only in special circumstances, such as during cell division.  
Multicellular organisms also contain genes that are expressed only in certain types of cells.).  ―The important 
biological functions of proteins (also called polypeptides) include: acting as enzymes (biochemical catalysts); 
binding for storage and transport of other molecules; providing support/shape to cells; decoding information in cells; 
and doing mechanical work such as contraction of muscles.‖.  Id. at 652-53.   
305
See HORTON, supra note 299, at 16-8. 
306HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 1-3 (6th ed. 2008); see HORTON, supra note 299, at 18-9 
("The most obvious of the features that distinguish eukaryotes from prokaryotes is the membrane-bounded nucleus 
in eukaryotes that contains the chromosomes . . . Whereas the genetic material, or genome, of prokaryotes is usually 
a single circular molecule of DNA, the eukaryotic genome is organized as multiple linear chromosomes.").   
307
AMP1, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 194, 200; Splitting, supra note 33, at 709 ("DNA serves as a template for protein but 
not the reverse"). 
 




Genes are basic units of DNA that are responsible for the inheritance of discrete traits in all living 
organisms.308  Stated slightly differently, the "gene is both the static chemical compound and the dynamic 
template executed through the genetic code."309  Generally each gene contains thousands of nucleotides 
and ―encodes‖ one or more proteins; in other words each gene contains the information used by the body 
to produce those proteins.  Some of the segments of DNA within a gene – ―exons‖ or ―coding sequences‖ 
– contain sequences necessary for the creation of a protein.  Other segments of DNA –―introns‖ – do not 
code for a protein.310  Introns are interspersed between the exons.311  "The totality of the genes and the 
non-coding regions of DNA constituting the genetic material of an organism are referred to as the genome 
of that organism."312 
 




Gene expression is the process by which the information encoded in a gene causes the production 
of protein.314  DNA regions called promoters initiate gene expression.315  The synthesis of proteins from 
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AMP1, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 194.  See also, Splitting, supra note 33, at 708 ("Genes are identified as the discrete 
units of DNA sequence that encode individual proteins and that collectively underlie the biochemical design of any 
organism."); Anita Varma & David Abraham, DNA is Different: Legal Obviousness and the Balance between 
Biotech Inventors and the Market, 9 HARV. J. L. TECH. 53, 57 (1996) ("A gene is a region of DNA on a chromosome 
whose sequence encodes a specific protein."); HORTON, supra note 299, at 647 ("We define a gene as a DNA 
sequence that is transcribed [see "Transcription" in text below for a summary of transcription].  This definition 
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309
Splitting, supra note 33, at 707. HORTON, supra note 299, at 816, defines the "genetic code" as "The 
correspondence between a particular three nucleotide codon and the amino acid it specifies.  The standard genetic 
code of 64 codons is used by almost all organisms.  The genetic code is used to translate the sequence of nucleotides 
in mRNA into protein." 
310
AMP1, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 194 and AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1336. 
311
AMP2, 653 F.3d at 1336. 
312
Splitting, supra note 33, at 708.  See also Hill, supra 139, at 224 ("The human genome consists of the genetic 
code of all the genes, gene control sequences, and genetic code with unknown or silent functions.  The genome is 
largely contained in the chromosomes of the cell and is approximately three billion nucleotide pairs.  Genes 
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313
See generally HORTON, supra note 299, at chapters 20, 21 and 22, for a detailed description of DNA replication 
and the production of protein by DNA and RNA. 
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See LODISH, supra note 306, at G-9; see HORTON, supra note 299, at 822 (a protein is a macromolecule 
"consisting of one or more polypeptide chains.  The biological function of each protein molecule depends not only 
on the sequence of covalently linked amino acid residues, but also on its three-dimensional structure 
(conformation).); id at 811 ("Amino acids are the building blocks of proteins."). 
315HORTON, supra note 299, at 652.  See also Hill, supra note 139, at 225 ("although every cell of an organism has 
the same genome, a cell expresses a different set of genes depending on its function . . . the transcription of a gene 
can produce variants of its full-length protein that differ in size and function without requiring any alterations in the 
genomic sequence . . . differential gene expression results from exposure to various environmental stimuli . . .  
Mutations or changes in the gene‘s DNA sequence occur spontaneously or in response to an environmental 
mutagen."). 
316
AMP1, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 197. 
317For a more detailed description of transcription, see generally, LODISH, supra note 306, at 120-26 and HORTON, 
supra note 299, at 647-80. 
 




During the first stage (transcription), the sequence of a segment of bases in the DNA is copied, or 
transcribed, into a related molecule called RNA (ribonucleic acid).318  RNA is also made up of 
nucleotides, but a strand of RNA differs from DNA in that it has a different sugar-phospate backbone than 
DNA, and the DNA base thymine (T) is replaced by a base called uracil (U).319  During transcription, a 
discrete segment of DNA unwinds320 and "each nucleotide on the non-coding, or template, DNA strand is 
used to make a complementary RNA molecule of the coding DNA strand, i.e., adenine on the template 
DNA strand results in uracil in the RNA molecule, thymine results in adenine, guanine in cytosine, and 
cytosine in guanine."321  This yields a strand of RNA called pre-RNA, which contains both exons and 
introns.322  The introns are then excised in a process called splicing to produce messenger RNA (or 






During the second stage in protein synthesis, the mRNA is translated into the encoded protein 
"via three nucleotide combinations called codons."325  A codon encodes "one of the twenty amino acids 
that make up all proteins or a 'stop' signal that terminates protein translation."326  The District Court said, 
"Because there are only twenty different amino acids but 64 possible codons that can be derived from 
combinations of the four DNA nucleotides, most amino acids are encoded by more than one DNA 
codon."327  Sixty-four codons code for these twenty amino acids, a property that biologists call 
―degeneracy.‖328  
 
Extracted and purified (i.e., isolated) DNA 
 
Researchers can extract DNA from its cellular environment, including associated chromosomal 
proteins, using a number of established laboratory techniques.  A particular segment of DNA, such as a 
gene, may then be excised from the extracted DNA in which it is embedded to obtain "purified" DNA.  
Researchers may also chemically synthesize DNA molecules in the laboratory.329 
In AMP, the District Court said that ―'native DNA' . . . is packaged, along with proteins, into 
complex structures known as chromosomes, which contain the vast majority of the genes located in the 
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685 ("The degeneracy of the genetic code minimizes the effects of mutations since changing a single nucleotide 
often results in a codon that still specifies the same amino acid."). 
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AMP1, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 196. 
 




cells of the human body."330  The court used the term ―extracted DNA‖ to refer to DNA that had been 
removed from the cell and separated from other non-DNA materials in the cell (e.g., proteins).  The court 
referred to ―purified DNA‖ to refer to extracted DNA which had been further processed to separate the 
particular segment of DNA of interest from the other DNA in the genome.  The court referred to 
―synthesized DNA‖ to refer to DNA which had been synthesized in the laboratory.331  This article uses 
those terms in the same manner here. 
As noted above, unlike purified or synthesized DNA, native DNA is not typically floating freely 
in cells of the body, but is "packaged" into chromosomes.  However, as part of natural processes "when 
DNA is copied, or replicated, in preparation for cell division, short segments of DNA are dissociated from 
the chromosomal proteins, although they are still contained within the cell."332  Also as part of natural 
processes, "when a particular portion of DNA is transcribed into RNA, segments of DNA exist 
dissociated from the proteins normally bound to it."333 
Researchers may use purified or synthesized DNA as tools for biotechnological applications for 
which native DNA cannot be used.  For example, unlike native DNA, researchers may use purified or 
synthesized DNA as a ―probe‖ to target and bind to a particular segment of DNA, thus allowing the 
detection of targeted DNA sequences through the use of standard laboratory machinery.  Scientists can 
also use purified or synthesized DNA as a ―primer‖ (a) to sequence a targeted DNA to determine the 
order of nucleotides in a DNA molecule, or (b) to perform polymerase chain reaction (―PCR‖) 





 Complementary DNA, or ―cDNA,‖ is a type of DNA molecule catalyzed by a protein known as 
―reverse transcriptase‖ generated from mRNA during ―reverse transcription.‖335  cDNA is 
―complementary‖ to the mRNA from which it is produced in that each base in the cDNA can bind to the 
corresponding base in the mRNA from which it is generated.  A cDNA molecule represents an exact copy 
of one of the protein coding sequences encoded by the native DNA, even though differences exist in its 
physical form.336 
"During reverse transcription, each base of the mRNA serves as a clamp for its complementary 
nucleotide to be incorporated into the new cDNA molecule while the chemical bonds between the 
nucleotides of the cDNA strand are formed. Much like transcription, uracil on the mRNA binds to and 
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thereby acts as a clamp for the nucleotide adenine, adenine for thymine, guanine for cytosine, and 
cytosine for guanine."337 
A scientist typically generates cDNA in a laboratory.338  However, cDNA does exist in nature as a 
result of retroviruses, which are viruses that have two identical RNA strands.339  In the life cycle of a 
retrovirus, "a viral enzyme called reverse transcriptase initially copies the viral RNA genome into single-
stranded DNA complementary to the virion RNA; the same enzyme then catalyzes synthesis of a 
complementary DNA strand."340  
 cDNA contains certain structural and functional differences from native DNA.  For instance, 
cDNA does not contain introns. As a result, the production of proteins from cDNA does not require RNA 
splicing.  Some cDNAs cannot be used to produce proteins without the addition of certain regulatory 
sequences.  In addition, native DNA is often (although not always) chemically modified in the body, 
while cDNA generated in the laboratory is not so modified.  cDNA also differs from mRNA in that it is a 
more stable compound and requires both transcription and translation to produce protein, rather than 
"simply translation" with mRNA.341  A scientist seeking to learn more about a certain protein may transfer 
a cDNA encoding the protein into a recipient cell that does not normally express that protein.342  Then, if 
"the cDNA is operatively linked to particular 'promoter' sequences that initiate transcription from the 
cDNA, the recipient cell will then express the protein of interest."343 
 
Primers and probes 
 
Probes are isolated DNA fragments with usually 15-30 nucleotides, and primers are 
isolated DNA fragments with usually 100-1,000 nucleotides.344  Molecular biologists use probes 
to bind to a particular segment of DNA, allowing detection of the target DNA sequence with 
standard laboratory machinery.345  Molecular biologists use primers to determine the order of 
nucleotides in a DNA molecule, or to perform polymerase chain reaction (―PCR‖) to duplicate 
the quantity of target DNA exponentially.346 
Scientists currently cannot use native DNA as probes or primers,347 but not all isolated 
DNA segments can be used for these purposes either.  For instance, "a small fragment of isolated 
DNA can be used as a primer in order to selectively detect the presence of the BRCA1 gene or 
BRCA1 gene mutation in a patient."348  On the other hand, "the full length gene is too large to be 
used as a probe" and "an entire isolated gene appears unsuitable for use as a primer in genetic 
screening for mutations in that same gene."349     
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